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I. Introduction
The “polluter pays principle” (PPP or principle) requires the polluter to
bear the expense of preventing, controlling, and cleaning up pollution. Its
main goals are cost allocation and cost internalization. In 1972, the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
articulated the principle explicitly and in 1989 indicated that it should be
applied to agriculture. Though the principle originated as an economic
principle, since 1990 it has been recognized internationally as a legal
principle.1 The principle now plays an important role in national and
international environmental policy. The European Community (EC) adopted
the principle in the 1987 Single European Act,2 and it has appeared in
international agreements, including the Rio Declaration of 1992.3 The
principle is an explicit part of legislation in some nations; in others, it is an
implicit subtext for both environmental regulation and liability for pollution.
The nature of agricultural production makes the principle difficult to
apply, and it therefore does not always apply to agriculture. In many nations,
environmental laws do not require producers to internalize all pollution costs,
and environmental subsidies to agriculture sometimes interfere with allocation
of those costs. Recently, however, nations have recognized serious air and
water emissions from agriculture, and some have enacted stricter
environmental regulation. In the United States, for example, the government
has implemented new rules for large livestock facilities,4 and in Europe the EC
has enacted the Nitrates Directive.5 Thus, consideration of the polluter pays
principle and agriculture is timely, important, and widely relevant.
Agricultural production practices have an effect on the environment, both
positive and negative.6 Broadly defined, these effects involve the introduction
of unwanted chemicals, considered pollutants, into the environment and the

1. Environment Directorate, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), The Polluter-Pays Principle: OECD Analyses and Recommendations, at 9, OECD
Doc. OCDE/GD(92)81 (1992) [hereinafter OECD, PPP Analyses].
2. Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1.
3. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 3-14,
1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1
(June 14, 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
4. 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 412 (2005).
5. Council Directive 91/676/EEC Concerning the Protection of Waters Against Pollution
Caused by Nitrates from Agricultural Sources, 1991 O.J. (L 375) 1.
6. See generally OECD, ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS FROM AGRICULTURE: ISSUES AND
POLICIES: THE HELSINKI SEMINAR (1997).
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consequent alteration of habitat and landscape.7 The polluter pays principle
addresses negative effects of agriculture. In recent years, intensification of
agricultural production in many nations has increased these effects, which may
include pollution of surface water and groundwater (e.g., with nutrients and
chemicals), emissions of substances (e.g., ammonia, particulates, and odors)
into the air, and pollution of soils. Other environmental effects, including
degradation of habitat and landscape in rural areas, may also occur. Because
emissions from agriculture are often diffuse, application of the principle raises
particular difficulties. But, in theory, the PPP should apply when agricultural
activities impose environmental harm that affects private and public property.8
Another principle, the “provider gets principle,” sometimes applies,
particularly when producers receive government support for activities that
affect the environment, either by avoiding harm or by providing environmental
amenities. Agricultural activity may provide attractive rural landscapes and
preserve important habitats, for example, which the public values.9 When
producers are asked to modify their practices to provide environmental
benefits rather than to avoid harm, subsidies can be justified.10 Payment for
environmental benefits, especially when farmers carry out practices beyond
required good farming practices, implements the provider gets principle.
The polluter pays principle is only one of several important environmental
principles. Other important principles include the precautionary principle and
the principles of preventive action and rectification of environmental damage
at its source.11 The PPP, of course, is closely related to these other principles,
and the focus here on the polluter pays principle is not intended to diminish
their importance. Indeed, the principles of precaution and preventive action
may, at times, help to avoid environmental damage that triggers the PPP.
Because the OECD and the EC have acknowledged and developed the
PPP, this article focuses first on those international organizations. After a
review of the OECD development of the principle in Part II and the EC
adoption of the PPP as a guiding environmental principle in Part III, the article
7. Ian Hodge, Agri-environmental Policy: A UK Perspective, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
216, 219 (Dieter Helm ed., 2000).
8. For an early analysis of PPP and agriculture, see DAVID BALDOCK & GRAHAM
BENNETT, AGRICULTURE AND THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE: A STUDY OF SIX EC COUNTRIES
(1991).
9. Hodge, supra note 7, at 219-20.
10. As the OECD noted, “Defining who pays and who is paid for the desired level of
environmental performance has important implications for the distribution of income and
wealth.” OECD, Improving the Environmental Performance of Agriculture: Policy Options and
Market Approaches, at 6, OECD Doc. COM/AGR/ENV(2001)6 (2001) [hereinafter
Environmental Performance].
11. On these principles in the EU, see infra text accompanying notes 59-60.
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looks briefly at its application in international agreements in Part IV. Part V
considers the various meanings of the PPP, and an analysis of its application
to agriculture in OECD documents follows in Part VI. Finally, in Part VII the
article briefly reviews the application of the PPP in U.S. agriculture.
II. OECD and the Polluter Pays Principle
A. Development of the Principle
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
receives credit for the first formal articulation of the polluter pays principle.12
The OECD, established in 1960,13 focuses on sustainable growth of economies
and improved economic and social well-being of citizens of the now-thirty
member states.14 Though the original emphasis of OECD was economic, the
environment and agriculture are important components of OECD efforts.15
The OECD explication of the PPP occurred in the early 1970s, and later
documents applied the principle to specific instances of environmental harm.

12. A European lawyer writing about the PPP identifies criteria for a legal principle. In his
view, a legal principle
XXx– regulates a legal issue of a rather fundamental nature,
XXx– is a general or common denominator of several specific rules (induction),
found in different parts of the law, thus creating a pattern across various sectors,
XXx– is used and accepted as a factor of importance in legal interpretation, in
cases where the rules are otherwise unclear,
XXx– could even be applied as a legal rule in areas where rules are lacking
(deduction),
XXx– would normally be used as basis for new legislation.
Hans Christian Bugge, The Principles of “Polluter-Pays” in Economics and Law, in LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 53, 73-74 (Erling Eide & Roger van den Bergh eds., 1996).
Such a principle would not, however, be a binding rule. Id. at 74.
13. Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Dec.
14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, available at 1961 WL 62596.
14. Members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg,
Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The OECD enjoys
global influence, because it has relationships with numerous other countries and NGOs. See
Ratification of the Convention of the OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_
2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
15. Other subjects that concern the OECD include health, education, taxation, trade,
finance, and even corruption and money laundering. See About OECD, http://www.oecd.org/
about/0,2337,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
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1. 1972: Guiding Principles
In the early 1970s, OECD countries, including the United States, began to
enact more stringent environmental measures. Industry feared the cost of these
measures and their effect on competition and therefore pressured governments
to subsidize the costs of regulatory compliance or impose environmental tariffs
on imports.16
In 1972, in response to concerns about the effect of subsidies and tariffs,
the OECD adopted its Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic
Aspects of Environmental Policies.17 Among these guiding principles is the
PPP:
The principle to be used for allocating costs of pollution prevention
and control measures to encourage rational use of scarce
environmental resources and to avoid distortions in international
trade and investment is the so-called “Polluter-Pays-Principle.”
The Principle means that the polluter should bear the expenses of
carrying out the above mentioned measures decided by public
authorities to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable state.18
Under the principle, the price of goods in the marketplace should include the
costs of pollution prevention and control. In general, polluters should not
receive subsidies “that would create significant distortions in international
trade and investment,”19 but in special cases, including “transitional periods,”
nondistorting subsidies can be permitted.20 The Guiding Principles do not
identify the optimal level of pollution, but refer instead to an acceptable state
for the environment. They present the PPP as an efficiency principle, aimed
at encouraging the “rational use” of resources.21 Thus, the PPP was initially
16. OECD, Environmental Principles and Concepts, at 12, OECD Doc. GD(95)124 (1995).
17. OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Guiding Principles Concerning
International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies, OECD Doc. C(72)128 (May 26,
1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1172 (1972) [hereinafter OECD, Guiding Principles]. Early
OECD Definitions and Recommendations are collected in OECD, THE POLLUTER PAYS
PRINCIPLE: DEFINITION, ANALYSIS, IMPLEMENTATION 11-20 (1975).
18. OECD, Guiding Principles, supra note 17, ¶ 4, 11 I.L.M. at 1172. The
Recommendation includes three other guiding principles: environmental standards (the
harmonization principle); national treatment and nondiscrimination; and compensating import
levies and export rebates. Id. ¶¶ 6-12, 11 I.L.M. at 1172-73. For a discussion of these
principles, see Candice Stevens, The OECD Guiding Principles Revisited, 23 ENVTL. L. 607
(1993).
19. OECD, Guiding Principles, supra note 17, ¶ 4, 11 I.L.M. at 1172 (1972).
20. Id. ¶ 5, 11 I.L.M. at 1172.
21. Id. ¶ 4, 11 I.L.M. at 1172. In fact, the Guiding Principles discuss environmental
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an economic, rather than a legal, principle.22
2. 1973: Note on Implementation
In 1973, the Environment Committee of the OECD drafted a Note on the
Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle.23 The Note emphasized that
public authorities in each state should identify the “acceptable state” of the
environment. The principle itself does not create any environmental standards;
it is “no more than an efficiency principle for allocating costs and does not
involve bringing pollution down to an optimum level of any type, although it
does not exclude the possibility of doing so.”24 Public authorities must decide
the means of implementing the principle; these may include “process and
product standards, individual regulations and prohibitions,” or pollution
charges.25 Subsidies for transitional efforts are acceptable exceptions to the
principle, provided that the “duration has been laid down in advance” and that
international trade is not distorted significantly.26 An exception could also
apply “when steps to protect the environment would jeopardise the social and
economic policy objectives of a country or region.”27 Moreover, financial
support of research and development does not violate the PPP.28
3. 1974: Recommendation on Implementation
The OECD Council adopted a Recommendation on the Implementation of
the Polluter-Pays Principle in 1974.29 This document reaffirmed that “[t]he
Polluter-Pays Principle constitutes for Member countries a fundamental
principle for allocating costs of pollution prevention and control measures

standards and the “tolerable amount of pollution” in a separate section. Id. ¶¶ 6-10, 11 I.L.M.
at 1172-73.
XXxThere is, however, considerable debate as to whether it actually encourages or hinders
efficient allocation and use of resources. See Bugge, supra note 12, at 55-56. Bugge states that
some scholars do not think the principle is important, while others view it as a “no subsidy”
principle, and still others view it as a principle of equity. Id. at 56. Bugge himself seems to
view it as both an equitable and an efficiency principle. See id. at 57.
22. Sanford E. Gaines, The Polluter-Pays Principle: From Economic Equity to
Environmental Ethos, 26 TEX. INT’L L.J. 463, 469 (1991).
23. OECD, Note on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle, OECD Doc. Env.
(73)32 (1974), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 238 (1975).
24. Id. ¶ 2, 14 I.L.M. at 239.
25. Id. ¶ 4, 14 I.L.M. at 239-40.
26. Id. ¶ 7, 14 I.L.M. at 240.
27. Id. ¶ 8, 14 I.L.M. at 241.
28. Id.
29. OECD, Recommendation of the Council on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays
Principle, OECD Doc. C(74)223 (1974), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 234 (1975).
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introduced by the public authorities.”30 It urged adoption by all member
countries to “encourage the rational use and the better allocation of scarce
environmental resources and prevent the appearance of distortions in
international trade and investment.”31
The Recommendation created a framework for determining whether aid
was consistent with the principle. It indicated that governmental subsidies for
pollution control are appropriate in only a few situations: to prevent significant
socioeconomic problems caused by rapid implementation of stringent pollution
control measures;32 to stimulate “experimentation with new pollution-control
technologies”;33 and to promote specific socioeconomic objectives when aid
has the “incidental effect of constituting aid for pollution-control purposes.”34
Assistance for pollution control should be “selective and restricted to those
parts of the economy, such as industries, areas or plants, where severe
difficulties would otherwise occur.”35 Aid should be granted for a limited
period of time, and it must not distort trade and investment.36
B. Later OECD Documents
1. 1989: Accidental Pollution and Agriculture
The OECD continued to promote the PPP, and later documents expanded
its reach and considered issues of interpretation. For example, the 1989
Council Recommendation on the Application of the Polluter-Pays Principle to
Accidental Pollution explicitly extended the principle to accidental pollution
from hazardous substances.37 OECD treatment of the principle during the
30. Id. ¶ I.1, 14 I.L.M. at 234.
31. Id. ¶ I.3, 14 I.L.M. at 235.
32. Id. ¶ II.2, 14 I.L.M. at 235.
33. Id. ¶ II.3, 14 I.L.M. at 235.
34. Id. ¶ II.4, 14 I.L.M. at 235.
35. Id. ¶ III.2(2), 14 I.L.M. at 235.
36. Id. ¶ III.2(3), 14 I.L.M. at 235.
37. OECD, Council Recommendation on the Application of the Polluter-Pays Principle to
Accidental Pollution, OECD Doc. C(89)88 Final (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1320 (1989).
This document defined accidental pollution as “substantial pollution off-site resulting from an
accident in a hazardous installation” and “hazardous installations,” in turn, as “fixed
installations . . . defined under applicable law as being capable of giving rise to hazards
sufficient to warrant the taking of precautions off-site.” Id., 28 I.L.M. at 1322. The
Recommendation reviewed the 1972 and 1974 OECD documents and indicated that operators
of hazardous installations should be held responsible for damage from accidents and measures
to prevent such accidents, but that operators should not be charged for accidental pollution from
events that they could not reasonably foresee, such as natural disasters. Id. Exceptions
developed in the 1970s apply to accidental, as well as chronic, pollution. Id., 28 I.L.M. at 132224; see also OECD, Notes by the Secretariat, Application of the Polluter-Pays Principle to
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1970s had focused only on chronic pollution; neither accidental nor nonpoint
source pollution had been addressed explicitly.38
Also in 1989, the OECD applied the principle to agriculture, in a
document discussed in more detail below.39
2. 1992: Analyses
Soon thereafter, the 1992 The Polluter-Pays Principle: OECD Analyses
and Recommendations40 outlined developments since 1972 and highlighted
some of the problems encountered in implementing the principle.41 Since its
initial articulation as a principle of economics, interpretation of the principle
had moved from application only to pollution prevention and control toward
full internalization of pollution costs. Costs covered by the principle now
included prevention and control,42 administrative measures taken by
government, damage caused by pollution,43 and most accidental pollution.44
Identification of the polluter is more difficult. Though early OECD
documents assumed the polluter was “the person whose activity had given rise
to the pollution,” “economic efficiency and administrative convenience” may
indicate that the manufacturer of an agent of pollution (for example, the
pesticide producer rather than the applicator) should be considered the
polluter.45 Moreover, though the polluter is responsible for certain costs, the

Accidental Pollution (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1325 (1989); Compensation for Victims of
Accidental Pollution (1991), in OECD, PPP Analyses, supra note 1, at 39-42.
38. OECD, PPP Analyses, supra note 1, at 7. In 1982, the OECD had focused for the first
time on accidental pollution. A publication on oil spills noted the conflict between different
delegations over whether the principle applied “in practice to cases of accidental pollution due
to oil spills.” OECD, COMBATTING OIL SPILLS: SOME ECONOMIC ASPECTS 20 (1982). This
report included an essay on the PPP and oil spills. Id. at 22-32.
39. OECD, AGRICULTURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES: OPPORTUNITIES FOR
INTEGRATION (1989) [hereinafter OPPORTUNITIES FOR INTEGRATION].
40. OECD, PPP Analyses, supra note 1. This document collects earlier Council Acts and
explanatory reports.
41. Id. at 8.
42. Emphasizing the economic nature of the principle, the OECD stated: “Generally
speaking, a polluter has to bear all the costs of preventing and controlling any pollution that he
originates. Aside from exceptions listed by OECD, a polluter should not receive assistance of
any kind to control pollution . . . .” Id. at 5 (citations omitted).
43. Id. at 6. In 1992, it was clear that the polluter who failed to take required pollutioncontrol measures would be liable to victims for damage. If the polluter has taken all the
required measures, liability is not so clear, though if the damage is significant the polluter
should generally pay the cost. Id. at 6-7.
44. Id. at 7-8.
45. Id. at 8.
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principle does not deal with liability in the legal sense because costs may be
passed on to another responsible party.46
3. 2001: Expansion
A decade later, the OECD continued to focus on the principle, though in
a broader context. The Polluter-Pays Principle as It Relates to International
Trade47 traced expansion of the principle, both in the OECD and in
international provisions, from an initial measure that provided for
internalization of the costs of pollution prevention and control — the “strict
sense” of the principle, or the “standard PPP” — to a measure that reflects full
internalization of environmental costs — the “broad sense” of the principle,
or the “extended PPP.”48 In its strict sense, the principle requires polluters to
pay costs of pollution prevention and control;49 in the broad sense, the
polluter’s responsibility extends also to other costs, including charges, taxes,
cleanup costs, and compensation.50
46. Id. at 9 (“Compensation funds financed by potential polluters” do not violate the
principle.).
47. Joint Working Party on Trade and Environment, OECD, The Polluter-Pays Principle
as It Relates to International Trade, OECD Doc. COM/ENV/TD(2001)44/Final (2002)
[hereinafter PPP and Trade]. WTO agreements did not mention the principle specifically, but
the question of subsidies does arise in WTO measures, for example in the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Agriculture. See id. at 21-22 for discussion of subsidies that apply to agroenvironmental measures under the URAA.
XXxThis report defined pollution as “‘the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of
substances or energy into the environment resulting in deleterious effects of such a nature as to
endanger human health, harm living resources and ecosystems, and impair or interfere with
amenities and other legitimate uses of the environment.’” Id. at 11 (citing OECD,
Recommendation of the Council on Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution, OECD Doc.
C(74)224 (1974), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 242 (1975)).
48. PPP and Trade, supra note 47, at 12-15, 34-37. The OECD recommended full
internalization of the PPP in a document adopted in May 2001 by the Environment Policy
Committee:
To effectively manage natural resources and ensure the continued provision of
essential environmental services, OECD countries will need to remove or reform
subsidies and other policies that encourage unsustainable use of natural
resources — beginning with the agriculture, transport and energy sectors . . . and
ensure the internalisation of the full external costs of natural resource use through
market and other policy instruments, and reflecting the User Pays Principle and the
Polluter Pays Principle.
OECD, Environmental Strategy for the First Decade of the 21st Century, at 6, ¶ 18, OECD Doc.
ENV/EPOC(2000)13/Rev 4 (2001) [hereinafter OECD, Environmental Strategy] (emphasis
added).
49. The original 1972 Recommendation is an example of an application of the principle in
its strict sense. See OECD, Guiding Principles, supra note 17.
50. PPP and Trade, supra note 47, at 12-15. While the OECD itself has not endorsed the
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The report also analyzed application of the principle in several OECD
member countries individually.51 Though OECD members generally require
pollution prevention and control, the report noted that some countries continue
to subsidize measures to control pollution.52 Thirty years after the 1972
recommendation, which emphasized the importance of the PPP to avoid
distortions in international trade, OECD researchers indicated that
environmental subsidies continue to distort trade when they give advantages
to producers and conflict with the PPP.53
III. Polluter Pays in the European Union
The Treaty of Rome of 25 March 1957, which established the European
Economic Community, did not provide for Community competence in
environmental matters.54 Even without special environmental authority,
however, a series of Environmental Action Programmes established the PPP
in Community policy. Environmental measures, mostly Directives, were
adopted under other sources of legislative authority, and these measures
applied the principle, explicitly or implicitly.55 Council Recommendations and
Guidelines also applied the principle. Finally, in 1987, the European
Community received clear authority to enact measures to protect the
environment, and polluter pays was adopted formally as an environmental
principle in the European Union.
A. The EC Treaty
The polluter pays principle became part of primary law in the European
Union on 1 July 1987, when the Single European Act (SEA),56 amending the
Treaty of Rome, came into force. The SEA enacted a new title on the
PPP in its broad sense, covering “the cost of pollution,” the report does note that OECD member
countries, in the 1990s, “advocated greater internalisation of pollution externalities,” and also
notes that the broad version of the principle applied in the Rio Declaration and the Stockholm
Convention. Id. at 13-15.
51. Id. at 23-26.
52. Id. at 23.
53. Id. at 27-28. The report recommends further research.
54. For more detail on development of environmental authority in the EC, see Margaret
Rosso Grossman, Agro-environmental Measures in the Common Agricultural Policy, 25 U.
MEM. L. REV. 927, 937-53 (1995).
55. For example, the European Council invoked the principle in a 1975 directive on waste,
which provided that “the costs . . . of treating the waste must be defrayed in accordance with
the ‘polluter pays’ principle.” Council Directive 75/442 of 15 July 1975 on Waste 75/442/EEC,
pmbl., 1975 O.J. (L 194) 39, 39. Animal and other agricultural wastes were excluded from the
directive. Id. art. 2, 1975 O.J. (L 194) at 40.
56. Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1.
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environment, which articulated objectives and guiding principles, authorized
environmental legislation, and made environmental protection a component of
other European policies. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty amended the
environment title slightly,57 and Treaty provisions were later renumbered.58
1. Environmental Principles
The Treaty title on the environment sets out environmental principles, and
those principles, including PPP, apply to agriculture and other EC policies.
Under the amended Treaty, “Community policy on the environment . . . shall
be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive
action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be
rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.”59 Under the so-called
integration principle, “[e]nvironmental protection requirements must be
integrated into the definition and implementation of [other] Community
policies and activities,” including agricultural policy.60
57. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1. The Maastricht Treaty
also made the integration principle clearer.
58. Treaty of Amsterdam, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 173. In June 2004, EU leaders
agreed on the text of a new Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. Dec. 16, 2004, 2004
O.J. (C 310) 1 (2004) [hereinafter Constitution]. The Constitution would create one Union,
replacing the European Communities and European Union, and it would govern the Union,
replacing the EU and EC Treaties. European Union, Summary of the Agreement on the
Constitutional Treaty (June 18, 2004), http://europa.eu.int/constitution/download/oth25064_2_
en.pdf (a nonpaper to provide information on the Treaty). The proposed Constitution would
include environmental provisions. Constitution, supra, arts. III-233 to -234, 2004 O.J. (C 310)
at 103-05.
XXxAfter translation into all official languages, the Constitution was signed by Heads of State
and Government of the Member States (and by Heads of State of three candidate countries,
Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey) in Rome, in October 2004. All twenty-five Member States
must ratify the Constitution, using their own constitutional procedures, before it can enter into
force. If the ratification procedure had been successful, the Constitution would have entered
into force in November 2006. European Union, Ratification of the Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe, http://europa.eu.int/constitution/referendum_en.htm (last visited Jan.
31, 2006). In May and June 2005, however, both France and the Netherlands rejected the
Constitution in national referenda, raising doubts about its success. Id.
59. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24,
2002, art. 174(2), 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, 107-08 [hereinafter EC Treaty] (emphasis added).
The Treaty articulation of the principle differs somewhat in the various languages of the
Community. Some versions make clear that the person who pollutes should pay for pollution
to the environment. While the “German version discloses nothing as to the substance of the
polluter pays principle” (and, indeed, refers to the “causer” principle), “[t]he French and
Portuguese versions yield somewhat more, pairing the concepts ‘polluter’ and ‘payer.’”
LUDWIG KRÄMER, FOCUS ON EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 247 (1992).
60. EC Treaty art. 6, 2002 O.J. (C 325) at 42; see also Constitution, art. II-97, 2004 O.J.
(C 310) at 49. Article II-97 states, “A high level of environmental protection and the
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2. Meaning of the PPP
The Treaty language itself does not provide hard-law answers to
questions — for example, who are polluters and what should they pay? —
about application of the polluter pays principle in the EC. A reliable
commentator, however, summarized the meaning of the PPP in 1992 as
follows:
Community action in environmental matters shall proceed on the
basis that the costs for the removal of damage that has occurred to
the environment where existing legal provisions have not been
adhered to is in principle to be borne by the emittor of the
pollution. The burden of such costs shall only be borne by the
general public in exceptional circumstances. Exceptions may be
formulated differently for the various regions.61
B. Environmental Action Programmes
Even before the amended Treaty enacted the polluter pays principle, that
principle had been formulated as “soft law” in EC policy and implemented in
secondary legislation. The PPP appears in the 1973 Programme of Action on
the Environment and can be traced through the five subsequent Programmes,
which should be seen as amendments to, rather than replacements of, the
original document.
1. First Environmental Action Programme
a) Adopting the PPP
The first Environmental Action Programme (EAP)62 appeared in
November 1973, long before the environment title, including the polluter pays
principle, had been added to the Treaty. Among the principles of a
community environmental policy, it stated that “[t]he cost of preventing and
eliminating nuisances must in principle be borne by the polluter.”63 The First
EAP, echoing the OECD, recognized “certain exceptions and special
improvement of the quality of the environment must be integrated into the policies of the Union
and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable development.” Id.
61. KRÄMER, supra note 59, at 253.
62. Declaration of the Council of the European Communities and of the Representatives
of the Governments of the Member States Meeting in the Council of 22 November 1973 on the
Programme of Action of the European Communities on the Environment, 1973 O.J. (C 112) 1
[hereinafter First EAP].
63. Id. Annex, 1973 O.J. (C 112) 3, 6. See KRÄMER, supra note 59, at 253-54, for the
clearer formulation in the Commission proposal for the First EAP.
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arrangements, in particular for transitional periods, [if they] cause no
significant distortion to international trade and investment.”64 In the context
of economic aspects of measures to control pollution, the EAP referred to
polluter pays as “the guiding principle for applying economic instruments to
carry out the environmental programme without hampering the progressive
elimination of regional imbalances in the Community.”65 This suggests that
further work is required to define the “nature, scope and means of
implementing this principle,” including possible exceptions.66
b) Defining the PPP
Soon thereafter, in 1975, the Council issued its Recommendation
Regarding Cost Allocation and Action by Public Authorities on
Environmental Matters, which called for uniform principles to allocate the
costs of environmental protection in all Member States.67 This document
continues to wield influence in the European Community. At the outset,
interestingly, it noted that the 1973 EAP had “adopted” the polluter pays
principle and indicated that charging polluters with the costs of action to
combat pollution would encourage reduction of pollution and development
of less polluting products and technologies.68
The heart of the Recommendation is its Annex, the Communication from
the Commission to the Council Regarding Cost Allocation and Action by
Public Authorities on Environmental Matters: Principles and Detailed Rules
Governing Their Application (Communication). The Communication
identified polluters and what they should pay. More precisely than the
OECD,69 the Communication defined a polluter as “someone who directly or
indirectly damages the environment or who creates conditions leading to such

64. First EAP, supra note 62, Annex, at 6. The First EAP also recommends the
implementation of the principle at the Community level, and suggests that further
“arrangements for its application including the exceptions” be defined. All of the fifteen EU
Member States, before the 2005 enlargement to twenty-five, belong to the OECD.
65. Id. at 30.
66. Id. at 32.
67. Council Recommendation of 3 March 1975, Annex ¶ 3, 1975 O.J. (L 194) 1, 2.
68. Id. Annex ¶ 2, at 2.
69. See PPP and Trade, supra note 47, at 11. The report states, “In the 1970s, the OECD
did not define who the polluter was because, at the time, that seemed fairly obvious: the polluter
is the party responsible for the polluting activity, i.e. the party having control over the activity
from which the emission of pollutants originates.” Id.
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damage.”70 When identifying the polluter is too difficult, such as with
cumulative pollution or a pollution chain,
the cost of combating pollution should be borne at the point in the
pollution chain or in the cumulative pollution process, and by the
legal or administrative means which offer the best solution from
the administrative and economic points of view and which make
the most effective contribution towards improving the
environment.71
Standards (e.g., legally binding environmental quality standards) and charges
for pollution are appropriate means of preventing pollution.72 Polluters
should bear the cost of pollution control measures and charges: “The costs to
be borne by the polluter (under the ‘polluter pays’ principle) should include
all the expenditure necessary to achieve an environmental quality objective,
including the administrative costs directly linked to the implementation of
anti-pollution measures.”73
2. Second and Third EAPs
Though the First EAP adopted the PPP, succeeding EAPs interpret the
principle more strictly, and it increases in importance.74 The Second EAP,75
published in 1977, restated the PPP in language similar to the First EAP.76 In
its focus on economic aspects, the EAP referred explicitly to the 1975 Council
70. Recommendation, Annex ¶ 3, 1975 O.J. (L 194) at 2. A footnote adds, “The concept
of polluter, as defined in this sentence, does not affect provisions concerning third-party
liability.” Id. ¶ 3 n.2, at 2 n.2.
71. Id. Annex ¶ 3, at 2. Krämer identifies this as an economic, rather than a legal,
formulation. KRÄMER, supra note 59, at 255.
72. Recommendation, Annex ¶ 4, 1975 O.J. (L 194) at 2-3.
73. Id. Annex ¶ 5, at 3. “The cost to the public authorities of constructing, buying and
operating pollution monitoring and supervision installations may, however, be borne by those
authorities.” Id.
XXxThe Communication lists several items that will not be considered contrary to the principle:
public funding of installations designed to protect the environment that are too extensive to be
funded by charges, financing to compensate polluters for exceptional costs in the face of
exceptionally stringent standards, and public contributions to research funding. Id. Annex ¶ 7,
at 4.
74. CH. W. BACKES ET AL., CODIFICATIE VAN MILIEURECHTELIJKE BEGINSELEN IN DE WET
MILIEUBEHEER 102 (2002).
75. Resolution of the Council of the European Communities and of the Representatives of
the Governments of the Member States Meeting Within the Council of 17 May 1977 on the
Continuation and Implementation of a European Community Policy and Action Programme on
the Environment, 1977 O.J. (C 139) 1.
76. Id. Annex I ¶ 17, at 6.
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Recommendation discussed above. The Second EAP recognized the need for
more study of the application of the principle, especially as it governs systems
of charges and transboundary pollution.77
In 1983, the Third EAP,78 though significantly shorter, provided
somewhat greater detail about the PPP. It discussed the principle in the
context of optimal resource allocation and indicated that the principle is of
“decisive importance.”79 Using market forces, the principle “constitutes [an]
incentive . . . [for polluters] to reduce pollution caused by their activities and
to discover less polluting products or technologies.”80 Relying, like the
Second EAP, on the 1975 Council Recommendation, the Third EAP reiterated
the importance of subjecting polluters to standards or charges and reviewed
the exceptions, limited in both time and scope, to the PPP.81 Charges, which
should also cover residual pollution, merit further study, and they must not
give the polluter a license to pollute. For the protection of nature and
landscape, state aid may be needed and is normally given to local authorities
or voluntary organizations.82 In implementing environmental protection
measures, the Third EAP would coordinate national and Community
environmental policies, to ensure a coordinated environmental policy in all
its regions.83
3. Fourth and Fifth EAPs
The Fourth EAP84 was published in 1987 after the Single European Act85
had made the PPP part of the Treaty. Thus, this Programme reaffirmed the
environmental principles and the integration principle set out in the SEA.
The Fourth EAP noted that economic instruments for pollution control must
be consistent with the principle, and referred yet again to the 1975 Council
77. Id. at 38.
78. Resolution of the Council of the European Communities and of the Representatives of
the Governments of the Member States, Meeting Within the Council of 7 February 1983 on the
Continuation and Implementation of a European Community Policy and Action Programme on
the Environment (1982 to 1986), 1983 O.J. (C 46) 1.
79. Id. Annex, at 7.
80. Id.
81. This echoes the OECD’s recommendations about exceptions. Commission decisions
in 1974 and 1980 had established that a Member State might grant aid to ease introduction of
new environmental regulations under certain conditions until 1987. Id. at 7.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Resolution of the Council of the European Communities and of the Representatives of
the Governments of the Member States, Meeting Within the Council of 19 October 1987 on the
Continuation and Implementation of a European Community Policy and Action Programme on
the Environment (1987-1992), 1987 OJ (C 328) 1 [hereinafter Fourth EAP].
85. 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1.
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Recommendation. The Commission was studying the possibility of extending
the deadline, originally the end of 1986, for transitional state aid for pollution
control measures.86
The Fifth EAP,87 adopted in 1993, focused on sustainable development
and therefore did little to develop the PPP. Instead, it seemed to take the
principle as a given, informing other measures. The Programme even
assumed that, with correct implementation of the principle, some measures
should pay for themselves.88 This EAP advocated economic instruments that
would “internalize all external environmental costs incurred during the whole
life-cycle of products.”89 In a comment that seemed to move away from strict
application of the principle, the Fifth EAP, discussing state aid compatible
with the PPP, noted the “growing importance of subsidies for particular types
of environmental expenditure.”90
Interestingly, the Fifth EAP also promised an integrated approach to
environmental liability, both to prevent damage to the environment and to
ensure restoration of damage. The PPP must be respected fully in a new
“mechanism whereby damage to the environment is restored by the person or
body who is responsible for the damage incurred.”91 This EAP anticipated the
environmental liability measure discussed below.92
4. Sixth EAP
Finally, the Sixth EAP,93 enacted in 2002 and in force until 2012,
continues to advance sustainability and the integration of environmental
protection into other Community policies. Like the earlier EAPs, it invokes
the PPP, albeit briefly. The Programme notes that it constitutes a
“framework” for Community environmental policy, which “shall be based
86. Fourth EAP, supra note 84, at 11, 15. The Fourth EAP indicated that the PPP could
be implemented in several specific environmental instances, e.g., waste recycling and charges
based on noise from landing aircraft. Id. at 28, 32.
87. Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member
States, Meeting Within the Council of 1 February 1993 on a Community Programme of Policy
and Action in Relation to the Environment and Sustainable Development, 1993 OJ (C 138) 1
[hereinafter Fifth EAP].
88. See generally id. at 70-72.
89. Id. at 71.
90. Id. at 72.
91. Id. at 82. The Fifth EAP also noted that a “comprehensive review of fines and
penalties” should be completed prior to the end of 1993. Id. at 81.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 135-52.
93. Decision No 1600/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 July
2002 Laying Down the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme, 2002 O.J. (L 242)
1.
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particularly on the polluter-pays principle” and the other EC environmental
principles.94 Environmental objectives must be met in light of these
principles.95 Promotion of sustainability, which will internalize both negative
and positive impacts on the environment, must also implement the
environmental principles, including the PPP.96
C. State Aid for the Environment
EU policies on state aid for the environment consider both the PPP and
free competition.97 The fact that state aid for environmental measures can be
available in appropriate circumstances indicates that the Community “sees the
polluter-pays principle as a principle which suffers derogations and
exemptions.”98
1. Community Guidelines
In 1994, the Commission published its Community Guidelines on State
Aid for Environmental Protection.99 In 2001, the Commission followed these
with a new set of Community guidelines.100 More extensive and more
detailed, these new guidelines insist that policymakers consider the effects
state aid may have on sustainable development and on “full application of the
94. Id. art. 2(1), at 3.
95. Id. art. 2(3).
96. Id. art. 3(4), at 5. An earlier proposal for the Sixth EAP provides more detail. Article
3 of that draft, “Strategic approaches to meeting environmental objectives,” would have listed
“[t]o promote the polluter pays principle . . . to internalise the negative as well as the positive
impacts on the environment” as a priority action for Member States. Communication from the
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and
the Committee of the Regions on the Sixth Environment Action Programme of the European
Communicty, at 74, COM (2001) 31 final (Jan. 24, 2001) [hereinafter COM (2001) 31].
97. Aid granted by states is governed by EC Treaty articles 87-89. Aid that distorts or
threatens to distort competition is prohibited. EC Treaty art. 87. Special rules exist for agriculture.
Id. art. 36; see Community Guidelines for State Aid in the Agriculture Sector, 2000 O.J. (C 28) 2,
3 [hereinafter Agriculture Guidelines].
98. LUDWIG KRÄMER, E.C. TREATY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 69 (3d ed. 1998).
99. Community Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection, 1994 O.J. (C 72)
3 [hereinafter 1994 Community Guidelines]. The guidelines balanced the requirements of fair
competition and environmental policy; aid could be justified when environmental benefits
outweigh harmful effects on competition. Id. ¶ 1.6. The guidelines, extended several times
(lastly at 2000 O.J. (C 184) 25), remained valid until 31 December 2000. They did not apply
to agricultural aid governed by Council Regulation No. 2078/92, 1992 O.J. (L. 215) 85, one of
the so-called “accompanying measures” that provided aid for agro-environmental projects in
connection with the 1992 CAP reform. See Grossman, supra note 54, at 1026-38 (discussing
the accompanying measures).
100. Community Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection, 2001 O.J. (C 37)
3 [hereinafter 2001 Community Guidelines].
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‘polluter pays’ principle.”101 Aid that aims at a high level of environmental
protection, with full internalization of costs,102 may be permitted, while aid
that merely helps polluters to comply with mandatory standards may violate
the PPP.103 Accordingly, “aid should no longer be used to make up for the
absence of cost internalisation. If environmental requirements are to be taken
into account in the long term, prices must accurately reflect costs and
environmental protection costs must be fully internalised.”104
2. Guidelines for the Agriculture Sector
These general Community guidelines, however, do not apply to the
agriculture sector.105 Instead, agriculture follows a separate regime, set out
in Community Guidelines for State Aid in the Agriculture Sector.106 For
agriculture, state aid is justified only if it respects the objectives of the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP),107 which must integrate environmental
considerations.108
The CAP, however, “was not designed as an
environmentally friendly policy,”109 and environmental objectives have been
integrated rather slowly. The CAP includes a number of programs that can
be said to implement the provider gets principle, but fewer that require the
agricultural polluter to pay.110
The Agriculture Guidelines govern more than a dozen types of aid (e.g.,
investments, young farmers, early retirement, damage to production, technical
support, and livestock) authorized by CAP legislative measures. Many of
101. Id. at 3, ¶ 4.
102. A definition explains: “[I]n these guidelines the ‘internalisation of costs’ means the
principle that all costs associated with the protection of the environment should be included in
firms’ production costs.” Id. ¶ 6. The guidelines are intended, in part, to ensure that
environmental aid does not disrupt competition and economic growth. Id. ¶ 5.
103. Id. ¶ 4.
104. Id. at 6, ¶ 20. The guidelines note, id. ¶ 19, that the 1994 Community Guidelines, supra
note 99, allowed aid on a temporary basis, when total cost internalization was not possible.
105. 2001 Community Guidelines, supra note 100, 2001 O.J. (C 37) at 4, ¶ 7. They do apply
to fisheries and aquaculture.
106. Agriculture Guidelines, supra note 97, 2000 O.J. (C 28) 2; see also Acceptance of
Community Guidelines for State Aid in the Agricultural Sector, 2004 O.J. (C 263) 8.
107. EC Treaty art. 33.
108. See EC Treaty arts. 6, 32-38; Agriculture Guidelines, supra note 97, 2000 O.J. (C 28)
at 4, ¶ 3.9.
109. Pamela M. Barnes & Ian G. Barnes, Understanding the Costs of an Environmentally
‘Friendly’ Common Agricultural Policy for the European Union, 11 EUR. ENV’T 27, 35
(2001).
110. For detail on the PPP and the European Union, see a companion article in this issue.
Michael Cardwell, The Polluter-Pays-Principle in European Community Law and Its Impact
on United Kingdom Farmers, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 89 (2006).
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these types of aid fall under the Rural Development Regulation,111 which also
authorizes aid for environmental undertakings. Under the Agriculture
Guidelines, aid for environmental measures must include special attention to
the EC environmental principles: “[A]id schemes which fail to give sufficient
priority to the elimination of pollution at source, or to the correct application
of the polluter pays principle cannot be considered compatible with the
common interest, and therefore cannot be authorised by the Commission.”112
The Agriculture Guidelines insist that state aid be paid only when the
farmer’s undertaking goes beyond “the usual good farming practice in the
area to which the measure applies.”113
Similarly, in certain areas where farmers work under environmental
restrictions to protect wild birds and identified habitats, aid for obligations
beyond good farming practice are permitted; moreover, aid “in breach of the
polluter pays principle should be exceptional, temporary and degressive.”114
Indeed, the 1992 Habitats Directive recognized specifically that “the ‘polluter
pays’ principle can have only limited application in the special case of nature
conservation.”115
The Agriculture Guidelines seem to apply the PPP strictly to operating
aid: “[t]he Commission does not normally approve operating aid which
relieves firms, including agricultural producers, of costs resulting from the
pollution or nuisance they cause.”116 Exceptions must be justified, for
example, for new national environmental requirements that go beyond
Community requirements or for development of biofuels, and this aid must
be temporary (no more than five years) and degressive.117
Special rules, which may conflict with the PPP, apply to small and
medium sized enterprises.118 In certain circumstances, such as investments in
111. Council Regulation No. 1257/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 160) 80, as amended (consolidated
version at CONSLEG 1999R1257 – 01/05/2004), to be replaced in 2007 and after by Council
Regulation 1698/2005, 2005 O.J. (L277) 1.
112. Agriculture Guidelines, supra note 97, 2000 O.J. (C 28) at 8, ¶ 5.1.3.
113. Id. at 9, ¶ 5.3.4.
114. Id. at 10, ¶ 5.4.2. The guidelines, id. ¶ 5.4.1, refer to the Rural Development
Regulation, art. 16, which allows payments for farmers who are restricted in connection with
the Wild Birds Directive, Council Directive 79/409, 1979 O.J. (L 103) 1, as amended, and the
Habitats Directive, Council Directive 92/43, 1992 O.J. (L 206) 7, as amended.
115. Council Directive 92/43, 1992 O.J. (L 206) 7, 8.
116. Agriculture Guidelines, supra note 97, 2000 O.J. (C 28) at 10, ¶ 5.5.1.
117. See id. ¶ 5.5.4 on rules for tax reductions.
118. Commission Regulation 1/2004 on the Application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC
Treaty to State Aid to Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Active in the Production, Processing
and Marketing of Agricultural Products, 2004 O.J. (L 1) 1. Small enterprises are enterprises
with fewer than fifty employees and annual turnover not exceeding seven million euros.
Commission Regulation 70/2001 on the Application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to
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agricultural holdings, and for limited time periods, states may grant aid to
enable small and medium sized producers to meet “newly introduced
minimum standards regarding the environment,” as well as to protect and
improve the environment.119
3. BSE Guidelines
Separate guidelines followed the crisis caused by bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE).120 These guidelines focus on tests, fallen stock, and
slaughterhouse waste. Disposal of both fallen stock and slaughterhouse waste
is costly but part of normal production costs. The polluter pays principle
would normally require producers of fallen stock and waste to bear primary
responsibility for the cost of removal. State aid for fallen stock disposal,
however, carries a low risk for distorting competition and may be critical for
protecting human health; therefore aid to producers, with limits, can be
permitted.121 State aid to slaughterhouses could distort competition and, after
a transition period, is generally prohibited.122 It is noteworthy that the effect
on competition helps to explain the difference in policy between producers
and slaughterhouses.
D. Environmental Liability
In the years between the Fifth and Sixth EAPs, the Community addressed
the issue of environmental liability, which had been mentioned briefly in the
Fifth EAP.123 In 2004, the Community enacted a Directive on Environmental
Liability.124
State Aid to Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, Annex I, 2001 O.J. (L 10) 33, 39. Medium
enterprises are enterprises with fewer than 250 employees and annual turnover not exceeding
forty million euros. Id. Regulation 70/2001 does not apply to agricultural products. Id. art.
1(2)(a), at 35.
119. Commission Regulation 1/2004, arts. 4(2), (5), 2004 O.J. (L 1) at 6. Time limits are
set out in art. 2(10), at 5.
120. Community Guidelines for State Aid Concerning TSE Tests, Fallen Stock and
Slaughterhouse Waste, 2002 O.J. (C 324) 2 [hereinafter TSE Guidelines]. Guidelines apply
from 1 Jan. 2003 until 31 Dec. 2013. Id. at 7. BSE or “mad cow disease” is a transmittable
debilitating neurological disease in a family of diseases (TSEs) caused by “prions.” A BSE
epidemic in England beginning in the late 1980s resulted in the death of over 160,000 cattle,
and some humans contracted and died from a related disease, variant Creutzfeld-Jacob disease.
In the United States, only a few cows have been diagnosed with BSE. See Christopher Busch
& Jan Paul Mincarelli, Mad Science and Mad Cows: The Case for EPA Regulation of
Prionicidal Substances, [2004] 34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,897, 10,897-99.
121. TSE Guidelines, supra note 120, at 4-5.
122. Id. at 5-6.
123. Fifth EAP, supra note 87, at 72, 82.
124. Directive 2004/35 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on
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1. Green Paper
Only a few months after publication of the Fifth EAP, the Commission
of the European Communities published its Green Paper on Remedying
Environmental Damage, intended to stimulate Community discussion.125 The
Green Paper considered the various uncertainties connected with fault-based
and strict liability principles as a method for allocating responsibility for the
costs of environmental restoration. The Green Paper invoked the PPP, noting
that “civil liability is a means for making parties causing pollution to pay for
the damage that results.”126 It wrestled with the question of what constitutes
environmental damage, including the “what is pollution” question that is
often asked in the context of the polluter pays principle.127 A brief survey of
Member State legislation indicated that most environmental liability regimes
contained elements of strict liability and that courts seemed to favor a strict
liability approach in the absence of legislation, as did international
instruments.128
2. White Paper
The 2000 White Paper on Environmental Liability129 continued the
discussion of liability beyond the Green Paper, setting out a structure for EC
environmental liability that would implement the PPP by ensuring that the
party in control of an activity is responsible for damage to the environment.130
Indeed, the White Paper insisted that the first objective of an environmental
liability regime should be “making the polluter liable for the damage he has
caused.”131 By enforcing liability, such a regime would force internalization
of environmental costs and create incentives for extra precautions and for

Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental
Damage, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 56 [hereinafter Directive 2004/35].
125. Communication from the Commission to the Council and Parliament and the Economic
and Social Committee: Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage, COM (93) 47 final
(May 14, 1993) [hereinafter Green Paper].
126. Id. at 5. Civil liability also enforces the prevention principle, because potential liability
is an incentive to avoid damage from pollution. Id. The Green Paper noted that the Fourth
EAP had indicated that polluters should be responsible for damage. Id. at 19; see Fourth EAP,
supra note 84, at 15, ¶ 2.5.5.
127. Green Paper, supra note 125, at 10.
128. Id. at 14-16. No Member State had adequately defined environmental damage.
129. Commission White Paper on Environmental Liability, COM (2000) 66 final (Feb. 9,
2000) [hereinafter White Paper].
130. Id. at 2.
131. Id. at 11.
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more research to avoid environmental harm.132 Ultimately, the White Paper
recommended enactment of a Community directive on environmental
liability, which would provide a general framework for liability in a number
of sectors. Under the proposal, strict liability would apply to certain
environmental damage caused by dangerous activities regulated by the EC,133
and fault-based liability would apply for damage to biodiversity caused by
nondangerous activities.134
3. Directive on Environmental Liability
In April 2004, the Parliament and Council enacted the Directive
recommended by the White Paper.135 The Environmental Liability Directive,
though limited in scope, is consistent with the PPP:
The prevention and remedying of environmental damage should
be implemented through the furtherance of the ‘polluter pays’
principle . . . . The fundamental principle of this Directive should
therefore be that an operator whose activity has caused the
environmental damage or the imminent threat of such damage is
to be held financially liable, in order to induce operators to adopt
measures and develop practices to minimise the risks of
environmental damage so that their exposure to financial liabilities
is reduced.136
Its purpose is “to establish a framework of environmental liability based on
the ‘polluter-pays’ principle, to prevent and remedy environmental

132. Id. at 11-12.
133. A strict liability approach seems consistent with the PPP, because the principle itself
does not distinguish between polluters who have acted intentionally or negligently and those
who were simply engaged in dangerous activity. Instead, it merely mandates that whoever
causes pollution should pay.
XXxSee also COM (2001) 31, supra note 96, at 20. This proposal for the Sixth EAP referred
to plans to create a community environmental liability regime:
The Treaty provides that Community environmental policy should be based upon
certain basic principles — among which the polluter pays principle and the
principle of preventative action. Thus, one of the important tasks for the
Community is to ensure that those who cause injury to human health or cause
damage to the environment are held responsible for their actions and that such
injury and damage is prevented wherever possible.
Id. (footnote omitted).
134. White Paper, supra note 129, at 30.
135. Directive 2004/35, supra note 124, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 56.
136. Id. pmbl. (2), at 56.
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damage.”137 It requires Member State cooperation to implement its
requirements.
a) Environmental Damage
The Environmental Liability Directive defines environmental damage
narrowly to include damage to certain protected species and natural habitats,
generally those protected by the Wild Birds138 and Habitats Directives139 or by
national nature conservation legislation.140 Environmental damage also
includes water damage and land damage.141 The Directive applies to
environmental damage caused by dangerous activities, listed in an Annex, as
well as damage to protected species and natural habitats caused by other
activities, when the operator has been at fault or negligent.142 The Directive
does not apply to personal injury, damage to private property, or economic
loss,143 so Member State legislation will continue to redress traditional
damage to persons and property.
Member States must implement the Directive through a competent
authority, and by 30 April 2007 must have national measures to comply with
the Directive.144 The Directive is not retroactive and does not apply to
damage caused before that date.145 Member State measures must require
operators, those who carry out the listed activity or hold the authorization for
the activity,146 to take preventive action to avoid environmental damage, to
apply measures to remediate the damage, and to bear the costs for preventive
and remedial actions.147
b) Application to Agriculture

137. Id. art. 1, at 59.
138. Council Directive 79/409, 1979 O.J. (L 103) 1.
139. Council Directive 92/43, 1992 O.J. (L 206) 7.
140. Directive 2004/35, supra note 124, art. 2(1), 2004 O.J. (L 143) at 59.
141. Id. Land damage is contamination that creates “a significant risk of human health being
adversely affected as a result of the direct or indirect introduction, in, on or under land, of
substances, preparations, organisms or micro-organisms.” Id. art. 2(1)(c).
142. Id. art. 3, at 60.
143. Id. pmbl. (14), at 57. The White Paper had recommended that strict liability apply to
damage to health and property from dangerous activities, but the Directive did not follow that
recommendation. White Paper, supra note 129, at 30.
144. Directive 2004/35, supra note 124, art. 19(1), 2004 O.J. (L 143) at 65.
145. Id. art. 17, at 64.
146. Id. art. 2(6), at 60.
147. Id. arts. 6-8, at 61-63. Member States can maintain or adopt more stringent measures
to prevent and remedy environmental damage and can identify additional activities and
responsible parties. Id. art. 16, at 64.
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The Directive applies to some agricultural activities. Annex III lists the
dangerous activities for which strict liability applies. Among these are the
contained use of genetically modified micro-organisms and the deliberate
release of genetically modified organisms.148 In addition, by reference to
activities that require environmental permits under the Integrated Pollution
Prevention and Control Directive,149 as amended, the Directive also includes
certain intensive pig and poultry facilities.150
In a provision that would seem contrary to the PPP, the Directive
indicates that Member States may allow the operator not to bear the cost of
remedial actions under some conditions.151 This exemption may apply if the
operator was not at fault or negligent and the damage was caused by an
emission or event expressly authorized and in compliance with national
measures that implement EC measures or by an emission or activity that the
operator can show was not considered likely to cause environmental damage
“according to the state of scientific and technical knowledge” when the
emission or activity took place.152
IV. Polluter Pays in International Agreements
Though some would say that the PPP is “rarely acknowledged” in legal
instruments other than OECD and EC texts,153 it does appear in a number of
international instruments.154 In these, the principle may take either a
“binding” or a “nonbinding” form. The binding form includes the PPP in an
“operative provision” of the measure, while the nonbinding form may
mention the principle only in the preamble.155 Two international instruments
148. Id. Annex III, at 71. Contained use is defined in Council Directive 90/219, 1990 O.J.
(L 117) 1, as amended (consolidated version at CONSLEG 1990L0219 - 20/11/2003); deliberate
release is defined in Directive 2001/18 of the European Parliament and Council, 2001 O.J. (L.
106) 1, as amended (consolidated version at CONSLEG 2001L0018 – 07/11/2003).
149. Council Directive 96/61 of 24 September 1996 Concerning Integrated Pollution
Prevention and Control, 1996 O.J. (L 257) 26, as amended (consolidated version at CONSLEG
1996L0061 – 20/11/2003).
150. Id. Annex I, ¶ 6.6. The facilities that require permits are poultry or pig operations with
more than 40,000 places for poultry, 2000 places for production pigs over 30 kg., or 750 places
for sows. Id.
151. Directive 2004/35, supra note 124, art. 8(4), 2004 O.J. (L 143) at 62-63.
152. Id.
153. NICOLAS DE SADELEER, ENVIRONMENTAL P RINCIPLES: FROM POLITICAL SLOGANS TO
LEGAL RULES 21 (2002).
154. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution
Allowances and the “Polluter Pays” Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 469 n.8 (2000)
(quoting relevant provisions).
155. DE SADELEER, supra note 153, at 23-24 (listing measures with binding and nonbinding
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that apply or expand the principle are the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development156 and the Council of Europe’s 1993
Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities
Dangerous to the Environment (the Lugano Convention).157
A. Rio Declaration
The influential Rio Declaration on Environment and Development adopts
the PPP explicitly in Principle 16:
National authorities should endeavor to promote the internalization
of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments,
taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in
principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public
interest and without distorting international trade and
investment.158
Moreover, Principle 13 indicates that states should develop “national law
regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other
environmental damage.”159
Commentators disagree about the impact of Principle 16. Some argue
that the Rio formulation of the PPP is stronger than the original OECD
codification, because it “directs governments to assure the internalization of
environmental costs through the use of economic instruments, not merely to
refrain from subsidizing the purchase and use of pollution control equipment
by private industry.”160 Another commentator noted, however, that the Rio
provisions).
156. Rio Declaration, supra note 3, 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992).
157. Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the
Environment, June 21, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1228 (1993) [hereinafter Lugano Convention].
158. Rio Declaration, supra note 3, prin. 16, 31 I.L.M. at 879. The Rio Declaration may be
the “main reference” for definition of the principle in its “broad sense.” PPP and Trade, supra
note 47, at 37.
159. Rio Declaration, supra note 3, prin. 13, 31 I.L.M. at 878. Principle 7 of the Rio
Declaration assigns a larger burden for sustainable development to developed than to
developing countries. Id. prin. 7, at 877. This, too, implicates the PPP, because it calls for
developed nations to internalize the costs of their emissions. See Christopher D. Stone,
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 276, 291
(2004).
160. David A. Wirth, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: Two Steps
Forward and One Back, or Vice Versa?, 29 GA. L. REV. 599, 643 (1995). European scholars
agree that the Rio Declaration seems to be broader; it refers to the polluter’s obligation to bear
the “cost of pollution.” BACKES ET AL., supra note 74, at 102. It goes beyond the cost of
necessary environmental measures and also includes the negative environmental externalities.
J. E. Hoitink, Het beginsel de vervuiler betaalt: ‘revival’ van een milieubeginsel, 27 MILIEU EN
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version is “much less progressive than those previously set out by the OECD
and the EC” because of its “aspirational” language and its reliance on
economic requirements for application.161
The Rio formulation of the principle does not include standardized
exceptions articulated by the OECD. Instead, it provides that the PPP should
be applied “with due regard to the public interest and without distorting
international trade and investment.”162 Even though it lists no specific
exceptions, the phrase “in principle” suggests that the drafter contemplated
the possibility of exceptions. The logical assumption, then, is that exceptions
to the version of the principle in the Rio Declaration should arise when its
application would be against the public interest or when it would distort
international trade and investment. Such an assumption might lead to the
various OECD and EU formulations and discussions, as the exceptions they
have developed seem to have similar goals.163
The Rio Declaration version of the PPP favors full internalization of
damage costs, as well as expenses for pollution control and prevention.164
Though the Declaration was not the first embodiment of the principle which
called for the internalization of damage costs, this is still a relatively recent
phenomenon.165
A related document, Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable
Development, implicitly recognizes the PPP in several provisions.166 Agenda
21 also includes a section on strengthening the role of major groups. Chapter
32, “Strengthening the role of farmers,” has an objective that includes
“pricing mechanisms that internalize environmental costs.”167
RECHT 30, 30 (2000). In the Rio formulation, Hoitink states, “The principle of polluter pays
is placed in a broader context, that is, as part of a policy that must be directed to stimulate the
internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments.” Id. at 30-31
(author’s translation). Nonetheless, not all negative externalities must be attributed to the
polluter — the PPP is not absolute. Id. at 31.
161. DE SADELEER, supra note 153, at 25.
162. Rio Declaration, supra note 3, prin. 13, 31 I.L.M. at 879.
163. Henri Smets discusses the possibility of exceptions, especially the EU and OECD
exceptions to the principle, and suggests that guidance be drawn from these. Henri Smets, The
Polluter Pays Principle in the Early 1990s, in THE ENVIRONMENT AFTER RIO: INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND ECONOMICS 131, 137-41 (Luigi Campiglio et al. eds., 1994).
164. Id. at 140.
165. Id. at 143.
166. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 3-14,
1992, Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/
26/Rev.1, ¶¶ 2.14, 30.3 (Aug. 12, 1992).
167. Id. ¶ 32.5.d. The paragraph states “[t]o introduce or strengthen policies that would
encourage self-sufficiency in low-input and low-energy technologies, including indigenous
practices, and pricing mechanisms that internalize environmental costs.” Id.
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B. Lugano Convention
The Lugano Convention168 is intended to ensure adequate compensation
for damage from activities that pose danger to the environment.169 It
introduces the PPP in its preamble: “Having regard to the desirability of
providing for strict liability in this field taking into account the ‘Polluter
Pays’ Principle . . . .”170 The Lugano Convention defines both damage and
the environment broadly,171 and would impose strict liability for damage
caused by dangerous activities or substances. The Convention would require
those engaging in dangerous activities to participate in a financial security
scheme, such as insurance, but anticipates no compensation fund.172 The
Lugano Convention may be “the only existing scheme for comprehensive
harmonization of environmental liability in Europe, or elsewhere. . . . It is the
only conventional scheme in which liability is not limited in amount and to
that extent reflects the ‘polluter pays’ principle more closely than other
treaties under which the loss is spread.”173
Though the Lugano Convention would apply the PPP in a strict liability
context, no country has ratified it, even twelve years after its adoption.
Therefore the Convention has not entered into force. One commentator
suggests that states may hesitate to participate in international liability
schemes, in part because they may require changes to national tort law.174
V. Some Observations About the Polluter Pays Principle
As a Dutch commentator noted, “Everyone knows the polluter pays
principle, but the exact legal meaning of the principle is still not clear.”175
168. Lugano Convention, supra note 157. The Convention refers to Principle 13 of the Rio
Declaration, which directs states to develop national law to compensate the victims of pollution.
Id. pmbl., 32 I.L.M. at 1230.
169. Id. art. 1, at 1230.
170. Id. pmbl., at 1230.
171. Id. art. 2, at 1231.
172. Id. art. 12, at 1235.
173. A. E. Boyle, Globalising Environmental Liability: The Interplay of National and
International Law, 17 J. ENVTL. L. 3, 15-16 (2005).
174. Id. at 16.
175. Hoitink, supra note 160, at 30 (author’s translation). Hoitink indicates that there is
much uncertainty about the meaning of the principle in legal practice, especially because the
principle has sometimes been viewed as an “adage,” rather than a legal principle. Id.
XXxAnother commentator noted: “The Polluter Pays Principle has come to mean all things to
all people, and, in this, it has been rendered somewhat meaningless.” Candice Stevens,
Interpreting the Polluter Pays Principle in the Trade and Environment Context, 27 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 577, 577 (1994).
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Moreover, despite the “simplicity” of the PPP, “[t]he more one attempts to
refine its definition, the more elusive the principle becomes.”176 The PPP
invites questions about its meaning and scope.
The OECD and EC documents reviewed above define and explain the
PPP in various ways. A recent definition, informed by those documents, is
succinct:
The polluter-pays principle is an economic rule of cost allocation
whose source lies precisely in the theory of externalities. It
requires the polluter to take responsibility for the external costs
arising from his pollution. Internalization is complete when the
polluter takes responsibility for all the costs arising from pollution;
it is incomplete when part of the cost is shifted to the community
as a whole.177
In reality, as its author recognizes, this clear statement defines an elusive
principle.
A. Shifting Meanings
In the decades since the OECD articulated the PPP as an economic
principle, its meaning has changed as it has assumed additional functions and
meanings. For example, the PPP is no longer solely an economic principle
designed to avoid distortion of competition, but has assumed some status as
a legal principle.178 It applied at first to preventive measures by polluters,
then was extended to the cost of government administrative actions
occasioned by pollution.179
Its goals have moved from a partial
internalization of the costs of pollution, under the OECD’s 1970s references
176. DE SADELEER, supra note 153, at 60. He continues:
The polluter cannot be pinpointed, because any act of pollution is the result of the
act of production — the creator of added value — as well as of final consumption.
The principle slips yet further from our grasp as pollution becomes increasingly
diffuse and historic in nature, rather than clearly identifiable and contemporaneous
with the damage produced.
Id.
177. Id. at 21.
178. OECD, PPP Analyses, supra note 1, at 9; see also DE SADELEER, supra note 153, at 22.
De Sadeleer states,
With its origins in economic theory, the polluter-pays principle has progressively
moved beyond the sphere of good intentions and scholarly commentary to become
a frame of reference for law-makers. It is the essential conceptual basis for a
range of legal instruments at the core of environmental legislation and has been
used as an element of interpretation by the courts.
Id. at 22.
179. Bugge, supra note 12, at 76-77.
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to keeping the environment “in an acceptable state,” in the direction of full
internalization of those costs.180 Polluters can be expected to pay for
measures to control and prevent pollution and, in addition, to restore damage
that occurred despite application of those measures.181
Different
interpretations of the principle emphasize these approaches.
In its earliest formulation, the 1972 OECD Recommendation, the PPP
was an economic principle,182 rather than a liability principle.183 It was
considered a “cost allocation or non-subsidization principle intended to guide
governments in addressing domestic pollution.”184 Under this interpretation,
sometimes termed the “weak” approach, the principle indicates that polluters
should internalize the costs of pollution reduction,185 at least to the level
required by government, and that governments should not subsidize polluters
or their pollution reduction. In contrast, the “strong” interpretation goes
beyond internalization of the cost of reduction to require polluters also to pay
cost to clean up residual pollution in the environment.186 Corollary goals of
180. DE SADELEER, supra note 153, at 26 n.30, 27.
181. BACKES ET AL., supra note 74, at 103-04. In this sense, the polluter pays twice. See
generally Lucas Bergkamp, De vervuiler betaalt dubbel: Over de verhouding tussen privaat en
publiek milieurecht, 7 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR MILIEURECHT 400 (1998).
182. Economists have differing views of the principle. “Some take the principle as a
fundamental principle of efficiency . . . other authors underline that the polluter-pays principle
does not necessarily lead to economic efficiency . . . .” Bugge, supra note 12, at 55. Other
economists view the principle as one of equity or as a political no-subsidy principle. Id. at 56.
183. The PPP “is not a liability principle, but rather is a principle for the allocation of the
costs of pollution control.” Gaines, supra note 22, at 468; see also OECD, PPP Analyses, supra
note 1, at 9. The report states,
The Polluter-Pays Principle does not deal with liability since it does not point to
the person ‘liable’ for the pollution in the legal sense. When a polluter is
identified he does have to bear certain costs and compensate the victims, but he
may pass the costs on to the actual party liable for the pollution, whoever it may
be.
Id. at 9.
184. Stevens, supra note 175, at 578.
185. This idea is, of course, consistent with the prevention at source principle. EC Treaty
art. 174(2).
186. Nash, supra note 154, at 473-77. The situation is more complicated, of course, with
multiple polluters or multiple victims. Eric Thomas Larson, Note, Why Environmental Liability
Regimes in the United States, the European Community, and Japan Have Grown Synonymous
with the Polluter Pays Principle, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 541, 550 (2005). The terms
“standard” and “extended” may also be used. Under the standard PPP, polluters pay the cost
of “optimal effluent control,” while under the extended PPP, polluters also pay the cost of “the
pollution damage done by the remaining optimal effluent.” John Pezzey, Market Mechanisms
of Pollution Control: ‘Polluter Pays’, Economic and Practical Aspects, in SUSTAINABLE
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 190, 208-09 (R. Kerry Turner ed.,
1988).
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the principle are incentives for reduced emission of pollutants and other waste
and development of technologies to reduce waste or its harmful effects.187
Another interpretation distinguishes the implicit and explicit principles.
The former refers to principles developed in economics and law that do not
use the term “polluter pays principle,” but do implement rules that require the
polluter to pay for the damage caused by pollution. Many environmental
laws, of course, fit in this category. The latter applies when the term, or
perhaps merely the concept, “polluter pays principle” appears in a legal
text.188
Even when the PPP is stated explicitly in a legal text, its impact may vary.
The principle may appear in the preamble to a measure, such as a multilateral
convention, where its role is “to interpret the more precise norms contained
in the convention.”189 In some measures, however, the principle is stated in
an operative provision and is therefore legally binding.190
B. Several Functions?
A thoughtful analyst suggested that the polluter pays principle has several
different functions that are “at time complementary and at other times
mutually exclusive.”191 The function of economic integration avoids
distortion of competition. The OECD’s early formulations prohibited state
aid to pay the costs of pollution control; limited exceptions, for defined
transitional periods, were not considered to distort trade. The redistribution
function requires the polluter to internalize the costs to government for
pollution-control activities. It may allow the polluter to continue to pollute,
as long as the polluter pays the appropriate price. The preventive function
should abate pollution by “encouraging polluters to reduce their emissions
instead of being content to pay charges.”192 This function of the PPP
complements the related environmental principle of prevention. Finally, the
curative function assigns responsibility to polluters for damage to the
environment that occurs despite compliance with regulatory requirements,
and it may also require compensation to victims of pollution. In so doing, it

187. Nash, supra note 154, at 479. A pedagogical effect may encourage members of the
public to take responsibility for their actions. Id.
188. Bugge, supra note 12, at 58.
189. DE SADELEER, supra note 153, at 23.
190. Id. De Sadeleer lists different measures, most dating from the 1990s, with the principle
stated in an interpretive role in the preamble or in binding form in operative provisions. Id. at
23-24.
191. Id. at 34.
192. Id. at 36.
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provides incentives to avoid harmful pollution and environmental
degradation.193
C. Several Principles?
Another commentator suggested that the PPP is really several principles
with a common core, “the fundamental economic principle of efficiency, and
the need to internalize the external effects of pollution.”194 These different
principles, which are both interrelated and overlapping, include
1. The PPP as an economic principle; a principle of efficiency.
2. The PPP as a legal principle; a principal of (“just”)
distribution of costs.
3. The PPP as a principle of international harmonisation of
national environmental policy.
4. The PPP as a principle of allocation of costs between
states.195
Each of these “principles” raises numerous questions of interpretation and
application. Briefly, the most basic statement of polluter pays as a principle of
economic efficiency is that “[t]he social costs of pollution should be
internalised in the polluter’s cost.”196 This economic principle suggests that
there may be an optimal level of pollution. In contrast, the PPP as a legal
principle (here, an implicit legal principle) starts from the premise that “nobody
has a general, a priori, right to pollute.”197 This version allocates the cost of
pollution between polluter and victim, normally making the polluter responsible
for the costs of “prevention, restitution and damage.”198 Difficult questions
remain, with focus on the nature of pollution, the identity of the polluter,199 the
193. Id. at 34-37.
194. Bugge, supra note 12, at 84.
195. Id. at 57.
196. Id. at 59.
197. Id. at 65 (emphasis omitted).
198. Id.
199. See, for example, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000), which identifies a broad group of “polluters,” the
potentially responsible parties, who face extensive liability. See also Larson, supra note 186,
at 552-55.
XXxThe OECD has not resolved the issue of who the polluter is — that is, when an emission
constitutes pollution. Under one approach, pollution occurs when emissions exceed a
governmentally-established threshold. DE SADELEER, supra note 153, at 38. Emissions that do
not exceed the threshold are not considered pollution. Under another approach, pollution is
defined by its impact on the environment; only when damage occurs do contaminants constitute
pollution. The latter definition, de Sadeleer believes, is appropriate for its “fairness,
appropriateness, and legal coherence.” Id. at 39-40.
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person who should pay, and what should be paid.200 As an international
principle of harmonization, polluter pays seems to refer to the OECD principle,
set out above.201 Though not legally binding, the OECD principle limits
government subsidies for measures that prevent pollution; thus it governs
“mainly the distribution of costs between the polluter and the government.”202
OECD member states determine their environmental control policies, so full
harmonization of national environmental policy is unlikely; moreover,
exceptions often apply.203 Finally, the principle of allocation of costs between
states raises complex issues of transboundary pollution.204
VI. Agriculture and the Principle in the OECD
The initial OECD formulation of the PPP focused on chronic, industrial
sources of pollution, rather than agricultural and other diffuse sources of
pollution.205 Early OECD recommendations on the PPP do not explicitly
mention or exclude pollution from agriculture. Seventeen years after its 1972
Guiding Principles, the OECD applied the PPP to agriculture. This delay
may be explained, in part, by the belief that pollution from agriculture is
different from other sources of pollution and that applying the principle to
agriculture raises rather unique problems. For example, agriculture generates
pollution, but it also has positive environmental effects.206 The growing
tendency to subsidize environmental outcomes in agriculture thus informs
application of the PPP to agriculture.207 Defining the PPP — deciding what
constitutes pollution and what a polluter should pay — is difficult, and in the
agricultural context, one also has to ask whether the producer should be
compensated for improved environmental outcomes. Moreover, most
agricultural activity occurs on privately-owned land, and property laws in
many nations give farmers broad discretion about use of their land.208
200. Bugge, supra note 12, at 65-76. On these questions, see also Charles S. Pearson,
Testing the System: GATT + PPP = ?, 27 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 553 (1994).
201. See supra text accompanying note 26. The 1972 OECD Guiding Principles also
included a harmonization principle (in section A.b.). See supra text accompanying notes 17-21.
202. Bugge, supra note 12, at 77 (emphasis omitted).
203. Id. at 75-77.
204. Id. at 81-83.
205. See James A. Tobey & Henri Smets, The Polluter-Pays Principle in the Context of
Agriculture and the Environment, 19 WORLD ECON. 63, 64 (1996).
206. See generally Joint Working Party on Agriculture and Environment, OECD, AgriEnvironmental Policy Measures: Overview of Developments, at 5, OECD Doc.
COM/AGR/CA/ENV/EPOC(2002)95/final (2003) [hereinafter OECD, Agri-Environmental
Policy Measures].
207. Id. at 6.
208. Tobey & Smets, supra note 205, at 72.
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A. Application to Agriculture
Thus, agriculture became a specific focus of the principle only in 1989,
when the OECD indicated that the PPP should apply to agricultural policies
and programs designed to prevent, control, or reduce pollution.209
Recognizing the interdependence of agriculture and environment, the OECD
takes into account the unique difficulties states encounter in trying to apply
the principle to the agriculture sector. In some instances, states have applied
the PPP by ensuring that farmers meet the cost of environmental restrictions
on farming practices and that they control on-farm pollution without
subsidies. But difficult issues remain. These include “identifying the
polluter, finding cost-effective methods of enforcing the Principle and finding
equitable methods of allocating the costs of off-farm control measures.”210
Input charges and levies may be an effective way to internalize pollution costs
and avoid placing the burden on taxpayers, especially when diffuse pollution
makes the polluter difficult to identify.211
Agricultural activities make up a continuum, ranging from those that
cause pollution to others that provide environmental benefits.212 National
policy choices will help to distinguish between polluting and nonpolluting
activities. Three basic considerations, though, should define implementation
of the PPP for agriculture. First, the PPP “should apply to all agricultural
policies and programmes which are designed to prevent, control or reduce
both point and non-point sources of pollution.”213 Second, adapting a
standard exception to the principle, financial assistance can be paid, but only
for a predetermined transitional period, if a new program redefines farmers’
environmental obligations and the payments will speed up environmental
209. OPPORTUNITIES FOR INTEGRATION, supra note 39. The OECD document states,
[T]o reduce agricultural pollution, different possible measures need to be
considered, either individually or in combination. In some cases, the setting and
enforcement of standards will be most efficient. In other cases, the
implementation of advisory procedures or the application of economic measures
such as incentives or charges may be superior to regulatory enforcement. In all
cases the Polluter-Pays Principle should be observed. Efforts should be made to
overcome the perceived difficulties associated with applying this principle to the
control of agricultural pollution from diffuse sources.
Id. at 7.
210. Id. at 59.
211. Id. at 60.
212. For example, designing and managing storage of animal manure to reduce ammonia
emissions is pollution control, while removing a hedgerow or woodland is “probably not
pollution,” though it destroys habitat. Id. at 60.
213. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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improvement.214 Third, to avoid conflict between the PPP and other policies,
payments directed toward nonenvironmental objectives should not be
considered payments for pollution control, even if they enhance
environmental values.215 Farmers who enter legal agreements to provide
positive environmental benefits, beyond the requirements of “normal
nonpolluting agriculture,” can be paid for the additional expenses and lost
revenues without violating the PPP.216 Compensation for lost production
activities can be paid, but only in specific, limited circumstances.217
B. Agriculture and Environment
1. Early 1990s
Having announced that the PPP should apply to agriculture, as well as
other industries, the OECD continued to evaluate agriculture and the
environment. In 1991, OECD ministers noted that it was necessary to set
“prices for agricultural inputs that reflect more fully their environmental
costs.”218 Soon thereafter, in 1993, the OECD summarized the progress of
member nations in improving environmental performance of farming in
Agricultural and Environmental Policy Integration: Recent Progress and
New Directions.219
The PPP is one of several principles formulated to integrate agricultural
and environmental policy, but “[w]hile OECD countries have agreed to apply
polluter pays mechanisms [to agriculture], their application is the exception
rather than the rule.”220 Countries may encounter difficulty applying a
principle that “runs counter to traditional agriculture-environmental
programmes in many developed countries,”221 especially in cases where
producers may expect to receive subsidies for the costs of meeting
environmental standards.222 The principle is technically difficult to apply to
agriculture, especially to nonpoint source pollution. The OECD did recognize
a number of “potential” polluter pays policies in member countries. Some
214. Id.
215. Id. at 61.
216. Id. at 62.
217. Id.
218. OECD, Communiqué of the Environment Committee Meeting at Ministerial Level, An
Environmental Strategy in the 1990s, OECD Doc. SG/Press(91)9 (Jan. 31, 1991), quoted in
PPP and Trade, supra note 47, at 34 n.91.
219. OECD, AGRICULTURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INTEGRATION: RECENT
PROGRESS AND NEW DIRECTIONS 7, 33 (1993).
220. Id. at 10-11.
221. Id. at 33.
222. Id. at 17.
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nations have enacted regulatory measures and taxes, for example, to
encourage pollution control.223 Even in countries that apply the PPP in
principle, though, “it is not strictly applied in practice.”224
2. 2001: Environmental Benefits
To continue its consideration of environment and agriculture, in 2001 the
OECD published Improving the Environmental Performance of Agriculture:
Policy Options and Market Approaches.225 Its brief references to the PPP
indicate that recent discussion has focused in part on the property rights of
farmers, as well as agriculture’s role in providing environmental benefits.
Indeed, its definition of the principle suggests that the polluter must pay
“where the consumptive or productive activities causing the environmental
damage are not covered by property rights.”226
This OECD document seems to adopt a “provider gets principle,”227 but
without using that term. If the “demand for environmental benefits goes
beyond a reference level marked by defined property rights, the pursuit of
environmental targets cannot be enforced without interfering with such
rights.”228 Reference levels are

223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 81; see also id. at 25.
Environmental Performance, supra note 10.
Id. at 10. The definition in full indicates that the PPP
states that the polluter should be held responsible for environmental damage
caused and bear the expenses of carrying out pollution prevention measures or
paying for damaging the state of the environment where the consumptive or
productive activities causing the environmental damage are not covered by
property rights. This is the principle used for allocating costs of pollution
prevention and control measures aiming to ensure a rational use of scarce
environmental resources and to avoid distortions in international trade and
investment.
Id. (emphasis added).
227. A Norwegian Minister of Agriculture explained the provider gets principle, which
deals with the provision of public goods (e.g. agricultural landscapes or rural
viability) . . . [and] relates to society’s demand for public goods beyond the
reference level, according to an established target. As such goods commonly
depend on private production factors, and since private property rights are
recognised, the PGP suggests payments, if necessary, to the provider of such
goods in order to achieve the desired resource allocation.
Jostein Lindland, OECD, Non-Trade Concerns in a Multifunctional Agriculture: Implications
for Agricultural Policy and the Multilateral Trading System, at 5, OECD Doc.
COM/AGR/CA/TD/TC/WS(98)124 (1998).
228. Environmental Performance, supra note 10, at 46.
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measurable levels of environmental quality that should be
achieved at the farmer’s own expense. Reference levels can be
expressed as environmental outcomes, farming practices, or
emission levels. The reference level therefore distinguishes
between the cases where the polluter pays principle requires that
farmers bear the costs of avoiding environmental damage, and
those where delivering environmental services by means of
privately owned resources or factors of production may require an
incentive.229
Environmental reference levels are generally achieved through good farming
practices, with costs of those practices paid by producers. Beyond that,
however, farmers who use “privately owned factors of production” to
improve the environment above the reference level provide a service and
should receive compensation.230 Of course, the PPP should apply to make
farmers accountable when “agricultural activities encroach on public property
rights through imposing environmental harm.”231
The OECD Environmental Strategy for the First Decade of the 21st
Century,232 also published in 2001, set goals for agriculture that reinforce both
the polluter pays and the provider gets principles, but did not refer to either
principle. OECD countries should
Promote the internalisation of environmental externalities in
agriculture, make the transition towards full cost resource pricing,
including environmental and social costs, and encourage the
implementation of market-based and other policy instruments to
enhance the provision of environmental benefits and reduce
environmental damage from agriculture.233
Member countries should promote sustainable and environmentally sound
farming practices and phase out or reform national policies and subsidies that
damage the environment.234

229. Id. at 9.
230. Id. at 46.
231. Id.; see also id. at 26 (suggesting that environmental reference levels and property
rights differ and evolve).
232. OECD, Environmental Strategy, supra note 48 (setting out a strategy for sustainable
development in a number of sectors).
233. Id. at 11.
234. Id.
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3. 2003: Developments
The OECD reviewed policy measures in OECD member countries in its
2003 report, Agri-Environmental Policy Measures: Overview of
Developments.235 Regulatory requirements address pollution from agriculture,
and these have gradually become more stringent. But during the 1990s the
use of agri-environmental payments, some of which may violate the PPP,
increased.236 The report focused on the PPP only in the context of
environmental taxes and charges. These are used less often in agriculture
than in other industries, perhaps because of difficulties of measuring diffuse
pollution or because they are sometimes thought to violate the property rights
of farmers.237 Taxes on estimated off-farm emissions or on the sale of inputs
such as farm chemicals in a few countries seem consistent with the PPP.238
4. 2004: A Decade of Lessons
As a summation, the OECD published Agriculture and the Environment:
Lessons Learned from a Decade of OECD Work in 2004.239 This report
conveys a strong sense that agri-environmental outcomes are part of a complex
system, shaped by a number of factors, including the vast scope of agricultural
production,240 the environmental harms and benefits of agriculture, and
agricultural and environmental policies. For example, agricultural support is
still linked to commodity production in some OECD countries, despite recent
policy changes in others. Commodity-linked support is an incentive for higher
production, which increases pressure on the environment. At the same time,
cross-compliance requirements and agri-environmental measures have led to
environmental improvements. Still, the environmental performance of
agriculture reflects the tension between environmental measures and
agricultural support.241
Though the PPP is not its main focus, this report offers some compelling
observations about application of the principle to agriculture. Environmental
laws and regulations do govern specific sources of agricultural pollution such
235. OECD, Agri-Environmental Policy Measures, supra note 206.
236. Id. at 11 fig.1.
237. Id. at 16.
238. Id. These include, for example, the minerals accounting system in the Netherlands;
taxes on pesticides and commercial fertilizers; and charges for water use. Id.
239. Joint Working Party on Agriculture and the Environment, OECD, Agriculture and the
Environment: Lessons Learned from a Decade of OECD Work (2004) [hereinafter Lessons
Learned].
240. “Agriculture in the OECD area accounts for around 40% of total land and nearly 45%
of water use and, in many countries, dominates and shapes the landscape.” Id. at 11.
241. Id. at 19-24.
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as livestock waste. In some instances, however, producers receive support to
cover the cost of compliance, an approach generally rejected in other
economic sectors. Therefore, the report notes, “[s]upport payments to offset
the cost of regulations need to be assessed in relation to the implementation
of the polluter-pays-principle.”242 In addition, the report calls for “full cost
internalisation to stimulate incentives to correct environmental damage and
encourage innovation in pollution treatment.”243
As the OECD had noted earlier, incentive payments dominate agrienvironment policy in OECD countries, and few environmental taxes and
charges apply.244 Farmers seem to claim “broad implicit or ‘presumptive’
rights in the use of natural resources.”245 The report therefore calls for more
clearly defined property rights boundaries for agriculture, which would help
to determine when farmers should be liable for environmental harm and when
they should be paid for environmental services beyond “good farming
practices.”246 That is, property rights regimes and environmental policies
should distinguish clearly between the polluter pays principle and the
provider gets principle.
In summarizing the policy lessons learned from OECD work on
agriculture and the environment, the 2004 report notes, “There is scope for
looking for ways to take greater account of agriculture’s environmental costs
and benefits in farmers’ production decisions, and for a more comprehensive
application of the polluter-pays-principle in agriculture.”247
VII. The Polluter Pays Principle and U.S. Agriculture
Though the United States has never formally codified the polluter pays
principle,248 many common law principles and statutes ensure that the polluter
pays, at least in some cases. Environmental plaintiffs often rely on tort causes
of action such as nuisance and negligence to claim compensation that
redresses damage from pollution. Many of the environmental laws enacted
in the 1970s and later, after the OECD articulated the principle, are consonant
242. Id. at 25.
243. Id. at 24.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 7.
248. Gaines, supra note 22, at 480. The author states, “The United States, in contrast to the
European Nations, does not officially recognize the PPP as a distinct principle or policy
mandate, but does, by natural political and economic inclination, closely follow its precepts in
practice.” Id. (citations omitted). Gaines notes that U.S. law gives few subsidies for pollution
control. Id.
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with the principle. In a sense the United States has, like some other nations,
applied the principle in laws that govern environmental liability.249 U.S.
environmental laws include, for example, measures to control emission of
pollutants, as well as measures to impose liability for the cleanup of pollutants
that have contaminated the environment.250
The environmental effects of agriculture, particularly intensive
agriculture, are well known and need not be rehearsed in detail here.251
Nonetheless, it is important to note that emissions from agricultural sources
remain a significant source of pollution. Nutrients and chemicals from crop
production, as well as waste from livestock operations, reach surface and
ground waters. Air emissions from intensive livestock production include
criteria and hazardous pollutants and odors.
The following brief discussions of arable farming and livestock
production suggest well-known situations in which the principle may not
apply, or may not apply fully, to emissions from agriculture. The discussion
is focused on application of the PPP through various U.S. laws and is not
intended to be a judgment of the approach or efficacy of the laws themselves.
It indicates, however, both that U.S. environmental laws often exempt
agriculture from measures that apply to other industries and that U.S.
agriculture policy relies on incentives and subsidies, rather than regulation,
to achieve environmental objectives.252 Indeed, one scholar announced that
“American agriculture policy has carefully avoided application of the
polluter-pays principle.”253
A. Arable Farming
The cultivation processes involved in arable agriculture result in runoff
and drainage from farm fields. These often contribute pollutants to surface
and ground water in the form of eroded soil along with various nutrients and
249. See Larson, supra note 186, at 544; see also id. at 547 (noting that the principle has
“informed the evolution of environmental law in the United States”).
250. E.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
7401-7515 (2000); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000) (creating liability under § 107); see also Nash, supra note 154, at 471.
251. See, e.g., John H. Davidson, Factory Fields: Agricultural Practices, Polluted Water and
Hypoxic Oceans, 9 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (2004); Jody M. Endres & Margaret
Rosso Grossman, Air Emissions from Animal Feeding Operations: Can State Rules Help?, 13
PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2004); J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms and
Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263 (2000).
252. See generally Ved P. Nanda, Agriculture and the Polluter Pays Principle, 54 (Supp.)
AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming 2006).
253. John H. Davidson, Sustainable Development and Agriculture in the United States,
[2002] 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,543, 10,557.
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chemicals that adhere to the soil particles. Federal environmental laws, as
well as most state laws, do not effectively require producers to minimize
erosion, nor do they assess damages for harm that might result. Regulating
the effects of erosion and other nonpoint source pollution raises special
difficulties, not addressed here. In reality, it may be extremely difficult, and
perhaps even ill-advised to apply the PPP fully to diffuse pollution.254
Federal environmental law exempts discharge of agricultural wastewater
from regulation. Exemptions apply both to point-like sources and to nonpoint
sources. For example, return flows from irrigated agriculture could be
considered point sources, because they come from a “discernible, confined
and discrete conveyance, including . . . any pipe.”255 The Clean Water Act
(CWA), however, explicitly excludes “return flows from irrigated
agriculture” from its definition of point sources of water pollution.256 The
CWA also excludes “agricultural stormwater discharges” from the definition
of point sources.257
Sections 208 and 319 of the CWA govern nonpoint source pollution,
including runoff from field agriculture.258 These sections require state
assessment, disclosure, and management programs, but do not impose federal
requirements.259 Federal regulators lack statutory authority to regulate
nonpoint source pollution, but instead provide financial incentives to
participating states.260 States often rely on incentives to implement these
sections, and few states have enacted mandatory measures to limit erosion.
Instead, states rely on Best Management Practices (BMPs), often identified
or recommended by the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to
prevent nonpoint source pollution, and the CWA authorizes grants to
encourage their adoption.261 One commentator indicates that the system of
BMPs results in “a relatively coordinated approach to nonpoint source
254. For example, farmers may not be able to pass along their expenses to control pollution;
identifying the source of nonpoint pollution is often difficult; and measuring its quantity is
costly and technically complex. David Zaring, Note, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution,
and Regulatory Control: The Clean Water Act’s Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 515, 534-35 (1996).
255. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
256. Id.
257. Id. For a further discussion, including history of this provision, see Ruhl, supra note
251, at 294-95.
258. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288, 1329.
259. Id.
260. David Zaring, Best Practices as Regulatory Regime: The Case of Agricultural Nonpoint
Source Pollution, [2004] 34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law. Inst.) 11,025, 11,025-27.
261. See NRDC v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1318 (9th Cir. 1990), cited in Zaring, supra note
260, at 11,025 n.7.
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pollution that is, whatever its flaws (and of course, there are plenty of flaws),
complex but coherent.”262
The Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) provision of the CWA263 relies
on state identification of impaired water bodies and their maximum loads of
pollutants, followed by state planning, for reduction of point and nonpoint
sources of pollution. Though TMDL requirements apply to nonpoint source
pollution,264 little evidence suggests that states are eager to apply TMDL to
govern runoff from agriculture.
Drainage of agricultural land, often by systems of underground tiles and
drains, results in pollution because drainage water includes sediment
accompanied by fertilizers and chemicals. State water laws may exacerbate
the polluting effects of agricultural drainage. State drainage rules often allow
changed flows of surface waters needed to make reasonable use of land. State
water use laws, in effect, “license the full use of public waterways to carry-off
drainage water.”265 State laws also authorize the formation of public water
districts, which may have “the single most profound effect in augmenting
runoff pollution” from fields.266
B. Livestock
Livestock production in the United States is increasingly concentrated in
large operations, where many animals are raised in confinement. Animal
feeding operations often generate large quantities of liquid and solid waste,267
which sometimes reach water sources and they may also emit significant
quantities of regulated air pollutants.268
262. Zaring, supra note 260, at 11,026. The author states, “Imposed by statute, but enforced
by no one, the CWA’s best practice program represents a rather elaborate, and yet uncoercive
example of addressing a regulatory problem through exchanges of information, disclosure
requirements, and money.” Id. “Thus, instead of rulemaker, EPA plays the role of funder of
nonpoint source best practices, as well as, in a limited way, endorser of them, via the
promulgation of particular practices that it and other regulators find to be effective.” Id.
263. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d).
264. Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Erin Tobin, Chapter,
Pronsolino v. Nastri: Are TMDLs for Nonpoint Sources the Key to Controlling the
“Unregulated” Half of Water Pollution?, 33 ENVTL. L. 807 (2003).
265. Davidson, supra note 251, at 3.
266. Id. at 3, 12-18.
267. The U.S. Department of Agriculture estimated that livestock in the nation’s 238,000
animal feeding operations produce more than 500 million tons of manure annually. 68 Fed.
Reg. 7176, 7179 (Feb. 12, 2003).
268. For a summary of federal regulation that governs water and air emissions from
livestock operations, see PERRY HAGENSTEIN ET AL., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE
NATIONAL ACADEMIES, AIR EMISSIONS FROM ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS: CURRENT
KNOWLEDGE, FUTURE NEEDS 129-51 (2003) [hereinafter AIR EMISSIONS].
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1. Emissions to Water
The CWA does, in part, apply the PPP to agriculture. Under the CWA,
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) are defined as point sources,
subject to the requirements of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES).269 Since the 1970s, EPA regulations have applied to
CAFOs through national Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards
(ELGs)270 and NPDES permit requirements.271 These regulations, however,
required a relatively small number of AFOs to obtain NPDES permits.272
After nearly a decade of discussion and negotiation, the EPA promulgated
new CAFO regulations in December 2002.273 The new regulations increase
the number of facilities that will be defined as CAFOs and must therefore
operate under NPDES permits.274 Regulations require producers to prepare
a nutrient management plan that includes best management practices and
procedures.275 Discharges that result from land application, but not those
from agricultural stormwater discharges, are subject to NPDES permit
requirements.276 The regulations also impose stricter effluent guidelines for
large CAFOs. In most cases, no discharge of wastewater pollutants is
allowed.277 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided a
challenge to the new regulations, upholding most of the CAFO regulations,
but vacating several provisions of the rule and remanding others to the EPA
for further clarification.278
269. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
270. 39 Fed. Reg. 5704 (Feb. 14, 1974) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 412).
271. 41 Fed. Reg. 11,458 (Mar. 18, 1976) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122).
272. In 2001, the EPA estimated that about 12,660 livestock facilities confined more than
1000 animal units, but that only about 4000 facilities had NPDES permits. 66 Fed. Reg. 2960,
2968-69 (2001); Envtl. Prot. Agency, Proposed Revisions to CAFO Regulations, Frequently
Asked Questions 5 (2001), http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/cafo_faq.pdf.
273. The regulations appeared in the Federal Register in February 2003, 68 Fed. Reg. 7175,
7176 (Feb. 12, 2003), effective April 14, 2003, though some requirements apply later. The
December 2002 deadline resulted from a consent decree entered January 31, 1992, and modified
thereafter. Id. The modified decree required a proposed rule by Dec. 2000 and final regulatory
action by December 15, 2002. 66 Fed. Reg. 2959, 2962 (Jan. 12, 2001).
274. 40 C.F.R. pt. 122.
275. Id. § 122.42(e)(1).
276. Regulations prescribe that “where the manure, litter or process wastewater has been
applied in accordance with site specific nutrient management practices that ensure appropriate
agricultural utilization of the nutrients . . . , a precipitation-related discharge . . . is an
agricultural stormwater discharge.” Id. § 122.23(e).
277. 40 C.F.R. pt. 412.
278. Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486 (2d Cir. 2005). The vacated
provisions are those that allow permits to be granted without a review of the nutrient
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Though the CWA regulates large animal production facilities as point
sources of pollution, emissions from smaller livestock facilities are not
regulated effectively. Facilities that are not defined by regulation as CAFOs
are considered nonpoint sources. These, like other nonpoint sources,
including erosion, are governed by less-effective sections of the CWA,
sections 208 and 319, which rely on state water quality analysis and
management programs.279 Some will also be regulated through state TMDL
programs required by CWA280 or through provisions of the Coastal Zone
Management Act.281 In general, however, regulation of nonpoint water
pollution from agriculture remains weak.
2. Air Emissions
Some would argue that application of federal air pollution measures to
livestock facilities does not apply the PPP. Air emissions from animal
feeding operations include particulate matter, gases, vapors, and odors.
Emissions come from animal confinement buildings, manure storage
facilities, and land application of waste.282 Air emissions from livestock
facilities include several pollutants regulated by the federal Clean Air Act
(CAA).283 Under the CAA, major sources of air pollution are required to
obtain permits and pay an annual permit fee.284 Most agricultural operations
are believed to be minor sources of air pollution, and few have been required
to obtain operating permits. Environmentalists, however, assert that many
large livestock facilities emit enough regulated pollutants, especially
ammonia, per year to exceed the CAA threshold and should therefore be
regulated as major sources.285

management plan, allow permits that do not include the terms of the nutrient management plan
or provide adequate public participation, and require CAFOs to apply for permits or
demonstrate no potential to discharge. Id. at 498-506. On remand, the EPA must also clarify
several aspect of the rule. Id. at 523.
279. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288, 1329 (2000).
280. Id. § 1313(d).
281. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1466 (2000) (especially § 1455b).
282. Endres & Grossman, supra note 251, at 3. For example, an August 2005 report
indicated that a major source of air pollutants in California’s San Joaquin Valley is gases from
dairy cattle. DAVID CROW, SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DIST., AIR
POLLUTION CONTROL OFFICER’S DETERMINATION OF VOC EMISSION FACTORS FOR DAIRIES 2
(2005).
283. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (2000).
284. See generally id. §§ 7661-7661f (governing permits); 40 C.F.R. pts. 70, 71 (2005).
285. See, e.g., Letter from Envtl. Integrity Project et al. to John P. Suarez, Assistant Adm’r,
Office of Enforcement & Compliance, Envtl. Prot. Agency (Sept. 2, 2003), http://www.rffund.
org/eip/docs/CAFOCAAltr9-2-03.pdf.
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In addition to the CAA, both the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)286 and the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)287 impose reporting
requirements that may apply to emissions from large livestock facilities.
These federal laws require reports from facilities that release a reportable
quantity of certain hazardous pollutants. The EPA has rarely enforced the
reporting requirement for livestock facilities that release hazardous air
pollutants, but large livestock operations are vulnerable to citizen suits for
failure to report.288
Monitoring air emissions from confinement buildings, feedlots, waste
lagoons, and other components of livestock facilities poses special
difficulties. Enforcement of applicable provisions of the CAA, CERCLA,
and EPCRA requires accurate measurement of emissions, arguably more
accurate than present technology allows.289 Thus, livestock facilities have
seldom been required to comply with these provisions.
A 2003 National Research Council study290 recommended development
of scientifically credible methods for estimating air emissions from livestock
facilities. The EPA subsequently proposed and enacted an Animal Feeding
Operations Consent Agreement.291 Under this voluntary program, animal
feeding operations agree to pay a civil penalty, contribute to a national
emissions monitoring program, and comply with certain environmental
requirements.292 Participants must make their facilities available for
monitoring; an independent organization will monitor representative farms.
In exchange for participation, the EPA agrees not to sue participating
facilities during the two-year monitoring period for certain violations of the
CAA, CERCLA, and EPCRA connected with livestock and livestock waste.293
286. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000). In general, CERCLA authorizes remediation of
certain hazardous waste sites and assigns liability for costs of cleanup when a responsible party
can be identified. On the PPP and CERCLA, see Nanda, supra note 252 (manuscript at 4-6).
287. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,001-11,050 (2000). EPCRA requires emergency planning and
notification to communities about storage and release of hazardous and toxic chemicals. Id. §
11,004.
288. CERCLA’s citizen suit provision is broad, id. § 9659(a), while EPCRA’s is more
limited, id. § 11,046(a).
289. See generally AIR EMISSIONS, supra note 268; PERRY HAGENSTEIN ET AL., NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS FOR ESTIMATING AIR
EMISSIONS FROM ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS (2002).
290. AIR EMISSIONS, supra note 268.
291. 70 Fed. Reg. 4957 (Jan. 31, 2005).
292. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Animal Feeding Operations Air Quality Compliance Agreement
Fact Sheet (Jan. 30, 2006), http://epa.gov/compliance/resources/agreements/caa/cafo-fcsht0501.html.
293. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss1/1

2006]

AGRICULTURE AND THE PPP: AN INTRODUCTION

47

Livestock producers could sign up to participate in the air compliance
program between 31 January and 12 August 2005.294 In total, 2681
applicants, with over 6700 farms, from forty-two states signed up for the
program, and the EPA approved the first twenty agreements in January
2006.295 After the EPA determines that all types of animals are represented
and agreements are approved, the two-year monitoring process on twentyeight to thirty selected farms can begin. Monitoring is designed to result in
data so that the EPA can develop accurate methodologies for estimating
emissions of air pollutants.296 Some would argue that this lengthy process,
which allows livestock facilities to continue their emissions, does not comply
with the PPP.297
C. Environmental Aid and the Polluter Pays Principle
Current U.S. agricultural legislation imposes environmental requirements
on producers who receive farm program payments and provides financial
incentives for conservation and environmental programs. The following brief
discussion focuses on cross-compliance measures, which help to implement
the PPP, and environmental subsidies, which do not. The discussion provides
examples, but does not attempt a comprehensive inventory of legislation.
1. Cross-Compliance
The 1985 Farm Bill298 was the first time that environmental interest
groups played a significant role in drafting federal agricultural legislation.299
Since then, environmental measures have played a more important role in
U.S. agricultural policy. Producers who receive federal farm support must
294. Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement, 70 Fed. Reg. at 4958; 70 Fed. Reg.
16,266 (Mar. 30, 2005); 70 Fed. Reg. 40,016 (July 12, 2005); 70 Fed. Reg. 44,631 (Aug. 3,
2005) (setting and extending sign-up deadline).
295. News Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Environmental Appeals Board Approves First
Air Compliance Agreements with Animal Feeding Operations (Jan. 30, 2006).
296. Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement, 70 Fed. Reg. at 4958; News Release,
Envtl. Prot. Agency, Thousands Sign Up for Animal Feeding Operations Air Compliance
Agreement (Aug. 15, 2005).
297. E.g., Editorial, Phew! EPA’s Giveaway to Feedlots, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 31,
2005, at A12. This Star Tribune editorial suggested that the amnesty is likely to last three to
six years. “In the meantime, the polluting operations will continue to pump out ammonia,
methane, hydrogen sulfide, fine particles and other noxious substances in concentrations that
are not only broadly annoying but sometimes harmful to the environment and human health.”
Id.
298. Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (1985).
299. Interview with Robert L. Thompson, Gardner Chair in Agric. Policy, Univ. of Ill. Dep’t
of Agric. & Consumer Econ. (Apr. 12, 2005).
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implement cross-compliance measures to conserve highly erodible land
(conservation compliance),300 and to protect wetlands (swampbuster).301 Both
programs are considered voluntary, because farmers are not required to accept
farm program payments.
Federal conservation provisions for highly erodible land (HEL)302 are
designed only in part to reduce pollution, that is, off-site damage from
erosion. Other goals are to keep HEL in production and to protect soil
productivity. The requirements apply to any producer “who in any crop year
produces an agricultural commodity on a field on which highly erodible land
is predominate.”303 Unless the producer applies a conservation plan using
approved conservation systems, he or she is not eligible for specific
government support, loans, and conservation programs. Violations of the
HEL provisions normally result in loss of federal farm program payments for
all commodities on all land farmed by the producer.304
Similar provisions protect wetlands, though the emphasis on preventing
conversion for farming suggests that the preservation of wetlands305 is a more
important goal than avoiding pollution. Under the “swampbuster” provisions,
producers will not be eligible for certain U.S. Department of Agriculture farm
program benefits if they have produced commodities on converted wetlands
after 1985 or have converted wetlands for crop production after 1990.306
Producers may be exempt from ineligibility if their actions have only a
minimal effect on wetland functions and values or if they mitigate the effects
of their actions.307 Furthermore, the Secretary of Agriculture may waive
300. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3811-3814 (2000); 7 C.F.R. pt. 12 (2006). Of course, soil conservation
was a federal and state priority long before 1985.
301. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3821-3824; 7 C.F.R. pt. 12.
302. Highly erodible land has an erodibility index of eight or more. 7 C.F.R. § 12.21(b).
The erodibility index is defined by the ratio of inherent erodibility (tons/acre/year on clean-tilled
land) to the soil loss tolerance (tons/acre/year without long-term loss of productivity). ROGER
CLAASSEN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE IN U.S.
AGRICULTURAL POLICY: PAST PERFORMANCE AND FUTURE POTENTIAL 2 (2004).
303. 16 U.S.C. § 3811(a). Compliance requirements are imposed field by field. If a field
has predominately highly erodible soils, conservation measures must be applied to the whole
field. CLAASSEN ET AL., supra note 303, at 14. A field is predominately HEL if 33.33% or
more of total acreage or fifty more acres are highly erodible. 7 C.F.R. § 12.22(a).
304. 16 U.S.C. § 3811.
305. To discourage conversion of wetlands, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986), eliminated some income tax benefits, including deductions for
expenses incurred in converting wetlands for agricultural use.
306. 16 U.S.C. § 3821. Swampbuster requirements are independent of § 404 of the CWA,
which requires permits for “discharge of dredged or fill material” into navigable waters,
including certain wetlands. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
307. 16 U.S.C. § 3822(f); 7 C.F.R. § 12.5. Mitigation may take the form of restoring a
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ineligibility for program benefits if the producer acted in good faith and with
no intent to violate wetland protection requirements.308 In February 2005, a
federal appellate court rejected a producer’s claim that Congress lacks
constitutional authority to make farm program payments contingent on
preserving wetlands.309
2. Subsidies — The Provider Gets?
U.S. agricultural legislation has long provided financial and technical
assistance to agricultural producers. Often this assistance has focused on
conservation measures, including those that would help to avoid the polluting
effects of soil erosion. A recent measure, discussed below, helps producers
implement measures to comply with environmental laws. To some extent,
these payments violate the nonsubsidy aspect of the PPP.
Some measures offer payments that help producers provide
environmental amenities (public goods) beyond mere avoidance of pollution
and beyond the minimum level required by law. These incentives may
provide an example of the provider gets principle, which indicates that “the
provider of a public good should receive payment for the provision of that
good.”310
a) Environmental Quality Incentives Program
Federal subsidies, which would seem to violate the PPP, are available to
producers, especially livestock producers. The Environmental Quality
Incentives Program (EQIP) helps producers to comply with regulatory
requirements for soil, water, and air quality; wildlife habitat conservation; and
surface and ground water conservation.311 First enacted in 1996, EQIP has
been reauthorized through 2007,312 with a significant funding increase to $1.3
billion in fiscal year 2007.313 Environmental practices relating to livestock
converted wetland, enhancing an existing wetland, or creating a new wetland in the same
watershed. 16 U.S.C. § 3822(i); 7 C.F.R. § 12.5(b)(4)(i).
308. 16 U.S.C. § 3822(h)(1).
309. Horn Farms, Inc. v. Johanns, 397 F.3d 472, 476-77 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting Horn’s
argument that the swampbuster provisions are a misuse of Congress’s spending power).
310. Hodge, supra note 7, at 220.
311. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3839aa to 3839aa-9; 7 C.F.R. pt. 1466. EQIP is now part of a program
now called the Comprehensive Conservation Enhancement Program; under prior law, it was
part of the Environmental Conservation Acreage Reserve Program.
312. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 2301, 116
Stat. 134, 253 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3839aa to 3899aa-9). The Conservation Title
reauthorized and amended a number of conservation programs, including EQIP, enacted in prior
agricultural legislation.
313. 16 U.S.C. § 3841(a)(6). Congress does not always appropriate the full authorized
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production are to receive 60% of EQIP funding.314 Payments to an individual
or entity are limited to $450,000 for all contracts entered during fiscal years
2002 through 2007.315
EQIP authorizes contracts, lasting from one to ten years, with producers
who agree to implement eligible environmental and conservation practices in
exchange for cost-share and incentive payments, as well as technical
assistance. “Practice” is defined to include structural practices (including
animal waste management facilities), land management practices (including
nutrient and manure management), and comprehensive nutrient management
planning practices.316 A livestock producer whose plan of operation includes
an animal waste storage or treatment facility is eligible for cost-share
payments if, along with other requirements, that producer develops and
implements a comprehensive nutrient management plan.317 The producer may
also be eligible for incentive payments to encourage development of the
nutrient plan,318 required by CAFO regulations. Incentive payments for
practices already required by law could be questioned under the PPP.
b) Conservation Security Program
The Conservation Security Program (CSP),319 enacted in the 2002 Farm
Bill,320 may provide a U.S. example of the provider gets principle. Though
CSP funding has been the victim of budget cuts and reallocation, the program
is designed to pay producers on working land to adopt or maintain
conservation practices that help to protect or improve the quality of soil,
water, air, energy, plant and animal life, and for other conservation purposes.
Eligible producers develop conservation stewardship plans and enter contracts
that set out the required conservation practices.321 Three tiers of conservation
funding amount for this and other programs, and conservation programs often bear the burden
of budget reductions.
314. 16 U.S.C. § 3839aa-2(a), (e), (g).
315. Id. § 3839aa-7. Since fiscal year 2003, however, EQIP payments, like many other
conservation payments, may not be made to an individual or entity whose average adjusted
gross income for the previous three years exceeds $2.5 million, unless at least 75% of that
income came from farming, ranching, or forestry. 7 U.S.C. § 1308-3a (Supp. III 2003).
316. 16 U.S.C. § 3839aa-1(3), (5), (6); 7 C.F.R. § 1466.3.
317. 16 U.S.C. § 3839aa-5(a)(3); 7 C.F.R. § 1466.9(c).
318. 7 C.F.R. § 1466.23(b). One might question the wisdom of incentive payments,
especially for producers required to develop and implement CNMPs under NPDES regulations.
319. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3838-3838c; 7 C.F.R. pt. 1469.
320. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat. 134
(2002).
321. Many conservation practices are eligible, including land and nutrient management
practices, wildlife conservation, invasive species management, and erosion control measures.
16 U.S.C. § 3838a. Land-based practices are preferred, and construction of animal waste
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contracts impose increasingly stringent requirements. Tier III, the most
stringent, involves contracts for five to ten years and requires producers to
apply a conservation plan for all resources of concern on the entire
agricultural operation. In exchange, producers receive a base payment and a
share — normally 75%, but for beginning farmers 90% — of the cost of
adopting or maintaining the required conservation practices.322
Practices eligible for compensation must go beyond a statutory reference
level, the minimum cross-compliance (that is, highly erodible land and
wetlands protection) required for receipt of federal farm program payments.323
Thus, the CSP is a U.S. example of application of the provider gets principle.
VIII. Conclusion
The PPP, which originated as an economic principle, has gained
acceptance as a principle of law. When applied, the principle can be effective
“to avoid wasting natural resources and to put an end to the cost-free use of
the environment as a receptacle for pollution.”324 Environmental statutes and
regulations in the United States and in other nations help to implement the
principle, though often its application is implicit rather than explicit.
storage or treatment facilities is not eligible. Id. § 3838c(b)(3). Land enrolled in the CRP,
WRP, and grasslands reserve program and some newly cultivated land is not eligible. Id. §
3838a(b)(3).
322. Id. § 3838c. The base payment is a percentage of the average national per-acre rent for
a specific land use. Id. § 3838c(b)(1)(A). Tier I contracts receive 5% of the base payment; Tier
II, 10%; Tier III, 15%. Id. § 3838c(b)(1)(C)-(E). Producers may receive enhanced payments
for multiple practices that exceed minimum requirements or other activities that improve
conservation. Id. § 3838c(b)(1)(C)(iii). Annual payments to individuals or entities are limited:
Tier I, $20,000; Tier II, $35,000; Tier III, $45,000. Id. § 3838c(b)(2)(A).
323. 16 U.S.C. § 3838c(c). On the reference level, see supra text accompanying notes 23537. This limitation is analogous to the approach to agri-environment payments under Council
Regulation 1257/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 160) 80. “Agri-environmental commitments shall involve
more than the application of usual good farming practice. They shall provide for services which
are not provided for by other support measures, such as market support or compensatory
allowances.” Id. art. 23, at 90. This language has been amended since original enactment, but
the requirement remains. See also Agriculture Guidelines, supra note 97.
324. OECD, PPP Analyses, supra note 1, at 9. The OECD noted that the PPP
is designed not to punish polluters but to set appropriate signals in place in the
economic system so that environmental costs are incorporated in the decisionmaking process and hence arrive at sustainable development that is environmentfriendly. . . . A degree of environmental pollution will certainly persist, and the
consumer will bear the cost initially charged to the polluter. But use of the
Polluter-Pays Principle will secure economic efficiency and will reduce distortions
in international trade and investment to a minimum.
Id.
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Application of the principle to some emissions from agriculture, however,
has been delayed. This delay can be explained in part by the nature of
agricultural production and its diffuse emissions. Long-standing attitudes
towards agriculture and long-recognized property rights may also play a role.
If agricultural production continues to intensify, the polluter pays principle
may demand more internalization of pollution costs from agriculture.
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